The Gay Debate: The Bible and Homosexuality

[steve7150]

"[H]omosexuality" is a broad category, and G-d may not engage all of its subcategories in the same way. Although the Torah makes the effort to forbid a woman having sex with an animal, it does not forbid a woman having sex with another woman. The Torah does forbid some homosexual activity between men; some homosexual activity between men (say, kissing) would be debatable.









Men kissing would be debatable? Women having sex with women may be OK because it's not specifically addressed, you think you can't deduce from the law against male homosexuality that it's not OK for women? Does the Talmud address women with women?

[kaufmannphillips]

steve7150 wrote:
Men kissing would be debatable?

Yes. The Torah forbids some manner of lying with a male. One could debate whether kissing does or does not transgress the boundary here.

If one thinks the very question to be ridiculous, then one may consider that many American congregations would say that heterosexual sex before marriage is a transgression, yet they would not say heterosexual kissing before marriage is a transgression.

steve7150 wrote:
Women having sex with women may be OK because it's not specifically addressed, you think you can't deduce from the law against male homosexuality that it's not OK for women?

If I am not mistaken, Steve, you do not have extensive experience in the practice of Torah. But you may appreciate that it already can be challenging to keep all of the explicit statutes in the Torah. If one wishes to supplement one's practice with ethics that are deduced from explicit statutes, one may do so. But it is good to distinguish in one's mind between the explicit and the derived - some deductions prove to have valor, and some eventually are a matter of shame.

If one is feeling deductive, one may notice that the Torah's prohibition against bestiality explicitly forbids both male and female participation in this sort of activity. Then one may notice that female homosex is not explicitly addressed. Of course, one party may yield a particular deduction from this, while another party may not.

But one may keep in mind that some ancient societies may have suffered an imbalance in gender populations. Between a general tendency for male infants to be less hardy, and a greater likelihood of male mortality in armed conflict/raiding, there might have been a lot of unattached womenfolk at times. Polygamy would be one solution to this sort of imbalance. (Of course, many present-day Christians are none too receptive to that.) And perhaps female homosex would be an accomodation to such an imbalance.

steve7150 wrote:
Does the Talmud address women with women?

I am not a talmudic expert, but I would not be surprised if it does. The Talmud is a monument to deductive activity - for better and for worse. Happily enough, it preserves a lot of differing opinions; one may explore it and consider the varying quality of deduced ethics.

[steve7150]

steve7150 wrote:
Men kissing would be debatable?



Yes. The Torah forbids some manner of lying with a male. One could debate whether kissing does or does not transgress the boundary here.

If one thinks the very question to be ridiculous, then one may consider that many American congregations would say that heterosexual sex before marriage is a transgression, yet they would not say heterosexual kissing before marriage is a transgression.

steve7150 wrote:
Women having sex with women may be OK because it's not specifically addressed, you think you can't deduce from the law against male homosexuality that it's not OK for women?












KP,
To the first point , i don't think using marriage as an analogy is effective as marriage is a covenant between the parties themselves and with God , which is a separate issue. Kissing between heterosexuals before marriage hopefully would be an expression of feelings leading toward marriage. Kissing between homosexuals if in a sexual nature would be leading to something the Torah forbids therefore a bad idea for several reasons.
As far as the women with women issue goes, i think the prohibition of male homosexuality extends to it but as you say, i'm no Torah expert but i know some and i will ask.

[kaufmannphillips]

steve7150 wrote:
To the first point , i don't think using marriage as an analogy is effective as marriage is a covenant between the parties themselves and with God , which is a separate issue. Kissing between heterosexuals before marriage hopefully would be an expression of feelings leading toward marriage. Kissing between homosexuals if in a sexual nature would be leading to something the Torah forbids therefore a bad idea for several reasons.

The Torah does not explicitly forbid homosexual marriage. Thus, one could argue that homosexual kissing also could be "an expression of feelings leading toward marriage."

steve7150 wrote:
As far as the women with women issue goes, i think the prohibition of male homosexuality extends to it but as you say, i'm no Torah expert but i know some and i will ask.

You might find it interesting to talk with a Conservative rabbi: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexual ... ve_Judaism

[BrotherAlan]

kaufmannphillips,

Thank you for your reply of June 4!

In that reply, you wrote:

My position is that interrelationality is the primary nature of sexual activity. It is always and inextricably an element of legitimate sexual activity. Procreation is not always an element of legitimate sexual activity, and it is an extricable element of said activity.

Now, first, I'd like to note that this position is, actually, begging the question. For, we are, in effect, asking the question, "What determines legitimate sexual activity?"

Secondly, the fact that actual procreation does not occur with each act of (heterosexual) sexual intercourse does not prove that it is not nature's primary purpose for sexual intercourse. For, it is possible for an agent to fail to fulfill its primary end (even while attaining to other, secondary ends). We see examples of this often in human activity. Example: the primary end for the San Antonio Spurs basketball team this year was to win the NBA championship (while one of their secondary ends was, for example, to to get exercise). Now, they did not win the championship this year (but they got exercise).

Now, there were a number of problems in the objections you raised to the argument which was put forward in my previous post (i.e., the argument which concluded that the primary end of sexual activity is the generation of children). First, the hypothetical scenario, involving the claw hammer, did not disprove the argument which was put forward. For one thing, the scenario was very extraordinary (and, being very extraordinary, it is not very helpful in illustrating universal principles). Also, the scenario was speaking of a claw hammer, which is a man-made thing, while the argument was speaking of natural things (and, so, the argument was not actually addressed by this scenario). Besides these things, I think there are also problems with the questions raised in regard to this scenario. For one thing, the questions raised are easily answered; for, since the primary end of a thing is that which it alone does, or that which it does better than anything else, it is clear that the claw hammer's primary end is to pound nails (for it does this better than any other tool), while its secondary end is to remove nails (for, even if one does not happen to possess a nail extractor/remover tool, such tools do exist, and they remove nails better than claw hammers do). Besides this, even if one were confused as to the purposes of a claw-hammer, such confusion would not deny any of the premises in any of the arguments which were put forward.

Also, you stated that, "It would be a fallacy to assume that things have only one natural purpose." First, the argument did not actually state that "things have only one natural purpose." What it did state is, "Natural things are structured in such a way so as to fulfill their purpose." So, first, the argument is speaking about natural things (and not "things" with a "natural purpose"; the difference does matter). Also, the use of the singular, "the purpose" (of natural things) refers to the primary purpose (or end) of natural things; it does not imply that there are not other, secondary ends (purposes) of natural things. So, an equivalent statement to that which was stated is, "Natural things are structured in such a way so as to fulfill their primary end (eg., the heart is structured in such a way so as to pump blood to the rest of the body)." In your objections, I did not find a refutation to this premise.

There were other, similar problems in the other objections which you put forward.

Now, to get back to the essence of the discussion at hand, I think it's necessary to simply consider, with due propriety, the natural purposes of those things which are involved in sexual activity. Now, if we were to ask, "What is the purpose of the male sperm," we would certainly answer, "To unite itself to the female ovum." Thus, I think it is sufficiently clear that the end of the male sperm is to be united to a female ovum, so as to generate offspring. Likewise, if we were to ask, "What is the purpose of the female ovum," we would answer, "To receive a male sperm." Thus, I think it is sufficiently clear that the end of the female ovum is to receive a male sperm (so as to generate offspring). Further, the changes that occur in the male during sexual activity have, as their end, the sending out of sperm; and, since the end of the sperm is to be united to the female ovum, it follows that the end of sexual activity for the male is the uniting of sperm to the female ovum (for the sake of generating offspring). Similarly with the female: the changes that occur in the female during sexual activity have, as their end, the receiving of sperm by the ovum, which is the primary end of the ovum; thus, it follows that the end of sexual activity for the female is the receiving of the male sperm into an ovum (so as to generate offspring). And, so, we see that the primary end of sexual activity for both the male and female is the union of the sperm and ovum, so as to generate offspring. Thus, any activity of a sexual nature is to be engaged in only between a man and a woman.

From this it follows that homosexual activity is activity with an end contrary to the natural primary end of sexual activity (for homosexual activity can never achieve the natural primary end of sexual activity, i.e., the union of the male sperm with the female ovum so as to generate offspring). This being the case, such activity is unnatural; being unnatural, it is disordered (and, being disordered it is, objectively speaking, sinful). And, since it is disordered activity that involves something as important as human generation (a matter which affects the very survival of the species), it is activity that is seriously disordered (and, so, such activity is, objectively speaking, seriously sinful).

This is what can be known by observing the nature that God has so marvelously created and by using our God-given reason. But, to help our poor minds, clouded as they are by sin, God has also deigned to teach us these truths through Divine Revelation.

Peace....

In Christ, the Savior,
BrotherAlan

[steve7150]

The Torah does not explicitly forbid homosexual marriage. Thus, one could argue that homosexual kissing also could be "an expression of feelings leading toward marriage."










It forbids homosexual sex therefore logically homosexual marriage is forbidden. However if you think otherwise that's fine.

[kaufmannphillips]

kaufmannphillips wrote:
My position is that interrelationality is the primary nature of sexual activity. It is always and inextricably an element of legitimate sexual activity. Procreation is not always an element of legitimate sexual activity, and it is an extricable element of said activity.

BrotherAlan wrote:
Now, first, I'd like to note that this position is, actually, begging the question. For, we are, in effect, asking the question, "What determines legitimate sexual activity?"

If I am not in error, we both agree that non-procreative sexual activity can be legitimate. I suppose that you would agree that a married heterosexual couple can continue to enjoy legitimate sexual activity even after a total hysterectomy. You can correct me if you disagree. But if this is so, then you must agree that "[p]rocreation is not always an element of legitimate sexual activity." Accordingly, inability to procreate is not a determinative factor in assessing the legitimacy of sexual activity.

I also suppose that you would agree that "interrelationality ... is always and inextricably an element of legitimate sexual activity." If you disagree, then please articulate and argue for your competing opinion. But if you agree, then please identify where you find fault with this line of argumentation:

Amongst sane and healthy humans:
(a) interrelationality is a ubiquitous and determinative factor in the legitimacy of sexual relations;
(b) procreation is not;
(c) it would seem highly peculiar for a ubiquitous and determinative factor to be "secondary" and an occasional and indeterminative factor to be "primary";
(d) it would seem more reasonable for a ubiquitous and determinative factor to be "primary" and an occasional and indeterminative factor to be "secondary";
(e) accordingly, interrelationality is more fittingly regarded as the primary nature of legitimate sexual activity, while procreation is at best a secondary nature.

Brother Alan wrote:
Secondly, the fact that actual procreation does not occur with each act of (heterosexual) sexual intercourse does not prove that it is not nature's primary purpose for sexual intercourse. For, it is possible for an agent to fail to fulfill its primary end (even while attaining to other, secondary ends). We see examples of this often in human activity. Example: the primary end for the San Antonio Spurs basketball team this year was to win the NBA championship (while one of their secondary ends was, for example, to to get exercise). Now, they did not win the championship this year (but they got exercise).

If you will pardon the jab, you are no better at identifying the primary end of the Spurs than you are at identifying the primary purpose for sexual activity. The primary end of the Spurs is to make money for its stakeholders. Making money is a ubiquitous and determinative factor in the continuance of the team. Winning a championship is not a determinative factor in the continuance of the team; many professional teams never win a championship, and yet they continue year after year. Why? Because they continue to make money for their stakeholders.

The primary end of the Spurs - making money - is a ubiquitous and determinative factor in their continuance. But procreation is far from a ubiquitous and determinative factor in the continuance of human sexual activity. Humans rarely discontinue sexual partnerships due to lack of procreation alone; but humans often discontinue sexual partnerships due to poor interrelationship, even when the sexual partnerships readily yield procreation. This is a further indication of which factor is primary, and which is secondary.

But the Spurs have scarcely "failed" to meet their primary end in a year when they do not manage to win the championship, yet do manage to turn a record profit. Likewise, human sexual activity has scarcely "failed" to meet its primary end when it does not result in procreation, but does result in a healthy relationship.

BrotherAlan wrote:
First, the hypothetical scenario, involving the claw hammer ... was very extraordinary (and, being very extraordinary, it is not very helpful in illustrating universal principles).

If a principle does not incorporate the "extraordinary," then it is not "universal."

BrotherAlan wrote:
Also, the scenario was speaking of a claw hammer, which is a man-made thing, while the argument was speaking of natural things (and, so, the argument was not actually addressed by this scenario).

Human artifacts have natures. An entity does not cease to have a nature, depending upon whether it was made by humans or by heavens or by mindless forces.

BrotherAlan wrote:
Besides these things, I think there are also problems with the questions raised in regard to this scenario. For one thing, the questions raised are easily answered; for, since the primary end of a thing is that which it alone does, or that which it does better than anything else, it is clear that the claw hammer's primary end is to pound nails (for it does this better than any other tool), while its secondary end is to remove nails (for, even if one does not happen to possess a nail extractor/remover tool, such tools do exist, and they remove nails better than claw hammers do). Besides this, even if one were confused as to the purposes of a claw-hammer, such confusion would not deny any of the premises in any of the arguments which were put forward.

Of course, you have adjusted your argument now to include not only "that which it alone does," but also "that which it does better than anything else."

The scenario addresses a toolkit - a limited entity with limited components. One can say the same for humanity - it is a limited entity with limited components. And if one of the components appears to have a distinctive application, it does not necessarily follow that said application is its primary purpose. Let us imagine that the toolkit also contains a hunting knife with a compass in its pommel. If there is no other orientation device in the toolkit, does it necessarily follow that the primary purpose of the hunting knife is navigation?

Let us also imagine that the knife has a really good compass, and a merely passable blade, so that its navigational potential is arguably what it does better than anything else. Even so, does it necessarily follow that the primary purpose for this knife is navigation?

I do not buy your premises here: I do not accept that the primary end of a thing is necessarily "that which it alone does, or that which it does better than anything else." But you can attempt to substantiate those premises, if you wish.

BrotherAlan wrote:
Also, you stated that, "It would be a fallacy to assume that things have only one natural purpose." First, the argument did not actually state that "things have only one natural purpose." What it did state is, "Natural things are structured in such a way so as to fulfill their purpose." So, first, the argument is speaking about natural things (and not "things" with a "natural purpose"; the difference does matter). Also, the use of the singular, "the purpose" (of natural things) refers to the primary purpose (or end) of natural things; it does not imply that there are not other, secondary ends (purposes) of natural things. So, an equivalent statement to that which was stated is, "Natural things are structured in such a way so as to fulfill their primary end (eg., the heart is structured in such a way so as to pump blood to the rest of the body)." In your objections, I did not find a refutation to this premise.

Use of the singular not only affords the opportunity for confusion; it creates a rhetorical punch that is unwarranted. Cautious and responsible articulation will avoid such things.

Would you also posit that "natural things are structured in such a way as to fulfill their secondary ends"? If so, then one should be aware that an argument from structure might not determine whether a particular end is "primary" or "secondary."

Brother Alan wrote:
Now, to get back to the essence of the discussion at hand, I think it's necessary to simply consider, with due propriety, the natural purposes of those things which are involved in sexual activity. Now, if we were to ask, "What is the purpose of the male sperm," we would certainly answer, "To unite itself to the female ovum." Thus, I think it is sufficiently clear that the end of the male sperm is to be united to a female ovum, so as to generate offspring. Likewise, if we were to ask, "What is the purpose of the female ovum," we would answer, "To receive a male sperm." Thus, I think it is sufficiently clear that the end of the female ovum is to receive a male sperm (so as to generate offspring). Further, the changes that occur in the male during sexual activity have, as their end, the sending out of sperm; and, since the end of the sperm is to be united to the female ovum, it follows that the end of sexual activity for the male is the uniting of sperm to the female ovum (for the sake of generating offspring). Similarly with the female: the changes that occur in the female during sexual activity have, as their end, the receiving of sperm by the ovum, which is the primary end of the ovum; thus, it follows that the end of sexual activity for the female is the receiving of the male sperm into an ovum (so as to generate offspring). And, so, we see that the primary end of sexual activity for both the male and female is the union of the sperm and ovum, so as to generate offspring. Thus, any activity of a sexual nature is to be engaged in only between a man and a woman.

The error here, of course, is that you have focused your attention upon only part of the apparatus which is involved in human sexual activity. Human sexual construction cannot be reduced to the functionality of gametes and pelvic organs - it also involves natural physiological/psychological "changes" in the human mind. These physiological/psychological changes have highly significant function, quite apart from the transmission or reception of gametes. These changes affect both personal health and a person's interrelationship with a sexual partner.

Now, it is clear that the human mind is primary, while the functionality of gametes and pelvic organs is secondary: a human without a mind is so grievously impaired as to nearly lose their humanity; while a human without functionality of gametes and pelvic organs is only marginally impaired, and unquestionably retains their humanity.

You give great attention to the dynamics within the human pelvis, and scant attention to the dynamics within the human psyche. This is a fundamental misstep.

[kaufmannphillips]

steve7150 wrote:
[The Torah] forbids homosexual sex therefore logically homosexual marriage is forbidden. However if you think otherwise that's fine.

Sexual activity is not a definitive or inextricable component of marriage. Thus, prohibition of sexual activity does not necessarily equate to prohibition of marriage.

[steve7150]

steve7150 wrote:
[The Torah] forbids homosexual sex therefore logically homosexual marriage is forbidden. However if you think otherwise that's fine.



Sexual activity is not a definitive or inextricable component of marriage. Thus, prohibition of sexual activity does not necessarily equate to prohibition of marriage.






I think sex is meant to be a important part of a biblical marriage unless it's not possible but i think it is the norm. If you have any examples of homosexual sexual relationships or homosexual marriages in the bible that God approves of or even accepts i would like to see them otherwise i think you are trying paint grey an area that simply is not.

[kaufmannphillips]

steve7150 wrote:
I think sex is meant to be a important part of a biblical marriage unless it's not possible but i think it is the norm.

There are people who care a lot about what is "normal." But "normal" is not "universal."

Some persons identify as asexual. If two such persons marry, should they be pressed into intercourse with each other out of some sense of "normalcy," or should they be afforded the opportunity to live a committed loving life in peace?

steve7150 wrote:
If you have any examples of homosexual sexual relationships or homosexual marriages in the bible that God approves of or even accepts i would like to see them...

The absence of an exemplar in the sacred text can hardly be taken as conclusive. The sacred text is a beginning to understanding, not the end of it.

steve7150 wrote:
...otherwise i think you are trying paint grey an area that simply is not.

The text does not forbid sexual activity of any kind between women. As mentioned above, this could afford an accomodation to imbalance in gender populations. It also could afford some resolution for intersexed persons, whereby a person of dual or debatable gender could take a female mate without scruple.

Now, pointing out the silence of the text is not "painting" anything; it is acknowledging what the previous painter(s) did not place on the canvas. Who is more vulnerable to charges of "painting" - a person who points out an absence in the text, or a person who derives a command that has not been articulated in the text?

As for male homosex, in this case the text can quite reasonably be construed in different ways; so here we have a debatable shade that has already been painted on the canvas. One may assert that it is "green"; another may insist that it is "blue"; either may be charged with "painting" if they wash over the ambiguity in the original artwork.