kaufmannphillips wrote:
Please define the circumstances under which a transaction would be exploitative, in your opinion
If a willing buyer and willing seller each give up something to gain something they desire more, then it is consensual and not exploitive by definition. The notion of exploitation involves the error of trying to substitute another's comprehension of value for that of the parties involved, hence the reason I cite
subjective value theory in defense of my position. That is to say, I deny the notion that some "objective value" exists by which a transaction can be judge exploitative. I affirm that exploitation cannot exist without some [other] specific sin being committed in the transaction.
For example, I would be willing to apply the term exploitation as descriptive of a fraudulent transaction. Suppose "A" agrees to buy two goats from "B" in exchange for ten ephah's of barley. However, by use of dishonest weights and measures, A actually gives B only nine ephah's of barley for the two goats. B has not consented to the exchange that actually took place. Hence A illicitly takes possession of the goats (or by another way of looking at it, A illicitly continues to possess one ephah of B's barley). B has been defrauded by A. Thus, one can say B has been taken advantage of by A unjustly for A's own ends. This is consistent with the
dictionary definition of exploitation. On the other hand, if A had given B the full amount of barley, then A has taken possession and ownership of the goats with B's approval. Likewise A has approved of B taking ownership of the ten ephah's of barley. A key element to establishing that the possession of property is licit is confirming whether the former owner did or did not consent to granting the ownership of said property away from himself and to another.
Thus the question in judging the ethics of a transaction is not if a transaction was exploitive, but rather the question is "was the transaction fraudulent?". Application to your examples as follows:
- Bruce and Larry: The attempt here is to substitute our "objective value" that beating is undesirable, for Larry's valuation that it is desirable. Larry is not exploited, and Bruce is not guilty of exploitation. Nonetheless, Bruce may well be guilty of another sin - causing injury to another person.
- Helen and Bill: Here again each gains something they value more, and part with something they value less. Bill does not deal fraudulently Helen, and the transaction is licit.
One might additionally observe that the incident occurred in an area where tornadoes are foreseeable. Bill invested his time and money into building the shelter. Helen decided to travel and assumed the risk of not being caught in a tornado. Helen could have taken another route, or could have waited for better weather. Bill could have forgone the shelter and built a bigger barn. For Bill to value his investment and charge a price for its use as he determines is to say he is getting of his investment back and profiting. Recouping an investment and making a profit is not exploitation.
If one were to say otherwise, then Helen can use the exploitation argument till the cows come home. She can say I need your shelter and your house too. She can say to the innkeeper after the tornado. I am tired. Give me a bed and shower for the price I dictate. Helen can say to the restaurant, I am hungry, give me breakfast. Helen can say to the tow truck owner, as her car is damaged, I need a tow, please tow me. She can say to the repair facility, I need repairs, please provide them for free. What Helen has done have turned all men into her slaves.
- Blanche: Although all examples given are fanciful, but this one is particularly so because it based on the premise that there a known market price for her vehicle. But, it is impossible for a market price to exist without the existence of other buyers. How is it that Blanche cannot avail herself of the option to sell the vehicle to another buyer besides Stanley for near $5000?
- The answer depends upon whether Sherilyn has misrepresented the properties. If she lied to Lenny about the market history then she is guilty of bearing false witness. If he has spoken nothing but truth to Lenny, then she has not exploited him.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Please define the circumstances under which a transaction would not be voluntary, in your opinion
Of course, "not voluntary" means that the transaction involves an element to where one of the parties does not consent. This means there is a violation, or threat of violation, of contract or property rights.
Example #1: "A" wishes to buy gasoline from "B". "B" is asking $4.00/gal, but "A" has the opinion that a "fair price" is $3.00/gal. "A" fills his tank with ten gallons, pays the cashier $30 and leaves. "A" took possession of the B's gasoline without B's consent, hence the transaction was not voluntary with respect to B.
Example #2: "A" wishes to buy gasoline from "B". "B" is asking $4.00/gal. "A" removes his loaded rifle from the trunk and points it at "B". "A" tells "B" if you don't sell gasoline to me for $3.00/gal, I will kill you. "B", under duress, tells A "Do as you wish - fill up your tank and leave $30.00". "A" takes ten gallons of gasoline, leaves $30.00 for "B", and then departs. The problem is that "A" has threatened to dispose of property that was not his own - namely B's own body.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
I have indicated that "each party should gauge the propriety of a price in light of its impact upon both the buyer and the seller. Each party should be looking out not only for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of the other party - loving their neighbor as themselves."
Indeed you have. I do not find this solution satisfactory for these reasons: First, is that each person is an independent unit of decision making; no two people are alike and rank values identically. As a consequence there is a reason to affirm that two parties can never reach agreement on the price. Second, people have finite knowledge of the state of affairs of the other party and cannot be certain of the integrity of the other party in communicating their expressed rational for receiving a certain portion of the benefit. That is to say, it is prudent for a person to take the Lion's share of the benefit and proceed to allocate it to those ends which he values most, rather than delegate it to the other party, whom has different values, and may fail to do as well in utilizing the resources. Third, the second point is closely relates to the scarcity of resources problem which I raised in a prior post. (I'll address these in a more detail further on in this post).
kaufmannphillips wrote:
It is worth mentioning that the State could provide the product in various locations at various times, in order to meet the needs of its citizenry. The State could charge a flat rate and apply the aggregate profit toward viable compensation for staff. Preferred locations and shifts could be allotted on the basis of seniority and performance review
Of course the State
could, but the relevant question to answer is why the State
should do such a thing?
kaufmannphillips wrote:
A person who has no associations with the parent/child is not their neighbor. But when the parent meets the seller in their place of business, they are each other's neighbor (cf. the parable of the Good Samaritan and the Greek diction employed). The seller, then, does not acquit their responsibility simply by doing better than nothing - the seller is responsible for loving the buyer as themselves.
Could you please specify, as exactly as possible, the answer to the question "Who is my neighbor?"
Regardless of how you answer, I am willing to simply amend my question by striking out the words "has no association at all" and replacing them with "has associations with". I believe the point thus expressed suffices equally well.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
G-d may dispose of owners as he wishes. And G-d wishes for owners to dispose of goods in ways that are in accordance with loving their neighbors as they love themselves.
I agree.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
A producer might continue to seek maximal production, so long as they continue to find the benefit from doing so to be desirable. If the State intervenes so that a producer reaps 20% less profit per widget, it does not necessarily follow that the producer will produce fewer widgets. So long as the producer continues to reap a desirable margin of profit, the producer might continue to maximize production.
In fact, permitting a higher margin of profit might yield less overall production. If a producer only needs to produce 2500 widgets to satisfy their overall desire for profit, then they might not plan to produce much more than 2500 widgets; but if a producer has a lower margin of profit, and needs to produce 3500 widgets to satisfy their overall desire for profit, then they probably will aim to produce at least 3500 widgets.
As such, imposing a benefit for the consumer at the expense of the producer could lead to an overall increase in wealth. The producer would sustain the same amount of benefit, but the consumer would end up with more product.
The above does not faithfully represent my statement. I said "overall production", whereas you replied as per "a specific line of production" (the number of widgets). The primary error of your objection is that it neglects the fact that a scarcity of resources (e.g. time, labor, materials) exists. I will present four points at some length to express the reason I disagree with your rebuttal.
First, the effects of taxation upon production are broader than only the business taxed. For whatever is expropriated from the widget manufacturer becomes the property of someone else. That person receives a benefit for which they did not labor or toil - that is to say he receives the benefits of the widget makers labor and toil. Not only the widget maker, but also such a beneficiary will, ceritas paribus, produce less than he otherwise would have. Any such taxation creates two classes of people - those who are expropriated, and those who receive the benefits of expropriation. Thus, we can also deduce that, ceritas paribus, individuals will have a greater tendency to act in such was so as to become members of the latter class than the remove membership from the former.
Second, maximal production of widgets is not optimal production of widgets. The fact is that the world, as God has made it, is characterized by a scarcity of resources. That is to say, a man's desires may well be without limit, but the means (labor, materials, time) he can employ to attain his ends are finite. If it were the case that more widgets would be produced, it inevitably follows that all other alternative uses of those same resources (e.g. for the making gadgets) are forgone.
Suppose an economy with no production and every person initially owns ten widgets and ten gadgets. Some individuals would prefer the situation of owning nine widgets and eleven gadgets, relative to the prospect of owning ten of each. Another may prefer the situation of owning twelve gadgets and five widgets relative to that of having ten of each. Every person ranks the value of one combination of widgets and gadgets to another combination of widgets and gadgets differently. Further suppose that individuals are free to exchange amongst each other widgets for gadgets. These trades are always advantageous to both parties. After a short time a "market price" would be demonstrated which reflects an aggregate valuation of human beings. We may perhaps observe that two widgets trades for one gadget, because the average person prefers
at the margin one additional gadget nearly the same as two additional widgets.
Now, suppose resources are found which could permit the creation of either one additional widget or one additional gadget - what should be done? Gadgets are the obvious choice.
Even a person who prefers having only widgets and zero gadgets, would rather have the gadget produced than the widget, because if he received the newly created product, he could trade the new gadget for two widgets, and he judges that having two widgets is better than having one gadget.
Now, suppose more production is added: Additional resources are found which could permit the creation of hundreds, thousands, or millions more gadgets. Does the answer remain fixed to the question about whether the next item produced should always be a gadget? Certainly not. Given the
theory of marginal utility, one would find that the market price of widgets to gadgets would fall as more gadgets are produced. In this example, when the market price falls below one it becomes better to produce a widget than a gadget.
So then, owing to the scarcity of resources, it is follows that neither maximizing widget production nor maximizing gadget production is ideal. But rather the production of widgets and gadgets is optimized in keeping with a ratio driven by the current market price. That is to say, driven by the valuations of those objects by human beings.
Going further, it should be recognized that the raw materials to produce the widgets and gadgets is a valuable item. That is to say, if the raw materials can be exchanged among market participants, then raw materials, being a scarce resource, will attain a certain price. The price of the raw materials is driven by the valuation of consumers of the final end products (widgets or gadgets), discounted in keeping with the subjective disutility of the labor required to fashion them into widgets or gadgets. Hence, whenever widgets are more desired by market participants than gadgets, one would find that gadget manufactures will suffer loss whilst widget makers profit. Or, if sentiments change and gadgets are more desired by market participants than widgets, one would find that widget manufactures will suffer loss whilst widget makers profit. In this way, the ratio of production stabilizes in keeping with consumer of demand, and this is a desirable state of affairs.
Now, suppose the State imposes a 20% tax on widget manufactures, but not on manufacturers of gadgets. The structure of production, ceritas paribus, will inexorably shift to producing more gadgets and less widgets than otherwise. Since gadgets and widgets can be exchanged among market participants, it can be concluded that all market participants are subjectively worse off than they otherwise would have been because the allocation of resources is suboptimial as a non-market bias towards gadgets was introduced. As far as I can see, it is of no value for you to object at this point that production of gadgets makes up for the loss of production of widgets, because per the forgoing discussion this change to the structure of production is less suited towards satisfying human desires, and hence is less desirable state of affairs. Recall my italicized sentence above.
Third, it is of utmost importance to point out that leisure is a end which human beings have a more or less universal tendency to value. The trade off between widgets and gadgets with respect to raw materials as expressed above could in like manner be made between widgets and leisure time. Here again the theory of marginal utility applies: Individuals have a choice to use any given increment of their time either in production of widgets, or leisure. Humans do not judge their state of affairs optimal to maximize widgets with zero leisure, or to have only leisure with zero widgets. The law of marginal utility applies to the trade off of time between producing widgets and enjoying leisure. Hence imposing a 20% burden upon widget production will, ceritas paribus, increase leisure at the diminish widget production. Again, as far as I can see, it is of no value for you to object that the additional leisure makes up for the loss of production of widgets, because per the forgoing discussion this change is less suited towards satisfying human desires, and hence is less desirable state of affairs.
Fourth, the consideration of the counterfactual: If only because the lifespan of human beings is finite, there are always new entrants into business. It follows, therefore, that if a 20% tax is levied upon widget makers, that some people whom otherwise may have become a widget manufacturer will not choose to do so. The magnitude of this can never be measured because the counterfactual is, by definition, that which could otherwise have been. It is not observable because it did not come into existence.
thrombomodulin wrote:
The issuing of a loan is not categorically different - new wealth, in the praxeological sense is thereby created, and thus both the lender and the borrower are better off than otherwise.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Our taxonomies may not correspond to G-d's... One can attempt a number of objections to the precepts of Torah, by way of categorization.
thrombomodulin wrote:
But this is not the argument I am making, because the creation of categorical distinctions is not a feature of my position. Recall my statement was denying the existence of categorical distinctions.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Denying a categorical distinction is, nevertheless, a matter of categorization. When you deny a categorical distinction, you are in effect placing your elements in a shared category.
Am I correct to understand that you affirm both that men may define distinct categories where God recognizes a shared category, and also you affirm that men may define a shared category where God recognizes distinct categories? If so, then it is established that there is no apriori reason to favor a position based upon whether one uses distinct or shared categories. Therefore the burden of proof falls to you. That is to say, the categorization argument holds no weight unless you can make a positive demonstration that a particular mode of categorizations align with God's categorizations in this particular instance.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
When I take goods or services from somebody else, I am taking away from their resources and adding to my own. My advantage - my profit - comes from another person. It does not spring ex nihilo. My "new value" comes at the cost of their "old value" (so to speak).
Perhaps I have not adequately communicated that in this context I am speaking of profit in the praxeological sense, rather than in a monetary sense. Indeed, physical objects do no spring ex nihilo - this is not my point. My point is that extend of a human beings satisfaction can be increased or diminished ex nihilo. Example: Both Wayne and Gavin each have ten widgets and ten gadgets. Wayne likes both widgets and gadgets, but at the margin he prefers widgets over gadgets. Gavin likes both widgets and gadgets, but at the margin he prefers gadgets over widgets. Gavin and Wayne agree to trade five widgets for five gadgets. Gavin now has 15 gadgets and 5 widgets and is more satisfied with new state of affairs than he had been when he owned 10 gadgets and 10 widgets. Wayne now has 15 widgets and 5 gadgets and is more satisfied with new state of affairs than he had been when he owned 10 gadgets and 10 widgets. There are still 20 widgets and 20 gadgets; No material objects have been created ex-nihilio. Gavin is more satisfied than he was before. He has experienced a praxeological profit because his subjective costs (less five widgets) are less than his subjective gains (attaining five gadgets). Wayne is more satisfied than he was before. He has experienced a praxeological profit because his subjective costs (less five gadgets) are less than his subjective gains (attaining five widgets). A more satisfactory state of affairs (a.k.a an increase in value) is thus attain ex nihilo.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
...Accordingly, I must be mindful not only of my valuation, but of their valuation as well. And I must consider what is equitable.
Wayne and Gavin, even if they wished to do so, have no way of comparing the magnitudes of the internal satisfactions they feel from owning widgets or gadgets. Alas, what you propose is impossible.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Scarcity is a relevant factor in discernment, but it does not exempt trade from the dynamics of love. If I give charity from resources that were obtained unlovingly, should I imagine that G-d smiles upon this?
May I discuss with my trading partner that I would like to obtain a greater balance of advantage in the exchange, so that I might apply it toward some charitable object? Of course. This would be quite appropriate within cooperative trade negotiation.
I expect God would smile upon it. The reason is that the scarcity of resources places before each man an either-or type of choice in the allocation of his resources. In so far as I allocate more to a trading partner, I necessarily have less to allocate to another. One, of course, should seek to allocate those resources that he controls as he understands God would want him to do. I see no particular reason why, ceritas paribus, I should consider the trading partner as more deserving of receiving resources than any other person whom is a valid object of my charity.
Example: I am a resident of the USA. Every person with whom I conduct commerce here in the USA is better clothed, fed, housed, than orphans in Uganda. If I take the lion's share of the negotiable profit margin and use it to support orphans in Uganda, I think God would smile upon that more than God would smile upon granting the lion's share to other party and presenting a lesser gift to those needy children in Uganda. But I anticipate you will reply that the other party could communicate to me that if they receive the lion's share they will use it to support orphans in Russia. They may even be speaking truthfully - although I could not be 100% sure. But until I can be convinced that it is God's opinion that Russian children are a better choice for charity than Ugandan children, my choice to take the lion's share remains the same. If I were to do otherwise, I would be conceding to allocating resources to what I believe God sees as a less desired end (Russian children) and forgoing what I believe God sees as a more desired end (Ugandan children). I expect God would not smile upon this.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
When one party suffers through the negligence of another, it is just for the governing power to hold the negligent party accountable for their negligence - if necessary, compelling them to rectify it.
The governing power may hold men (and women) accountable for neglecting to practice charity = for neglecting to love = for neglecting what's due to others.
Ownership does not vacate responsibility. One is responsible for how one manages one’s resources - and part of that responsibility is an equitable concern for the needs and interests of others.
I disagree. Here, I will assert a categorical distinction between contract and charity. They are different in that contracts are fulfilled or violated objectively (e.g. one either did or did not use dishonest weights and measures), and charity is fulfilled in degree (God has not stipulated exactly "how much" charity is required of a man). God has at times authorized human beings to enforce breaches of contract. As far as I am aware, He has never delegated the task of enforcing His admonishments of charity to human beings.
thrombomodulin wrote:
True, but after the 2% have spent the money to purchase the smut, then they no longer have money - and the price of smut would move from stratospheric to zero.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Oh, please - people with huge wads of disposable cash frequently manage to get their hands on more wads of cash. Sustained income and sustained appetite will sustain the price of smut
Oh really? How is it that they could possibly get their hands on more cash if it were not the case that they engaged in some type of production that other market participants valued? Your analysis is severely lacking as you have neglected this all important feature.
thrombomodulin wrote:
I would point to the expropriation of Naboth's vineyard, and the various instances of disobedience of the NT authors to the civil authorities of their own time to confirm that at least some limitations do exist.
kaufmannphillips wrote:
Of course, Naboth’s vineyard was expropriated to satisfy the covetousness of the king, not to satisfy the needy. And I am unaware of any NT disobedience to taxation that was levied for relief of the poor.
Would you affirm that if Naboth had been more wealthy than Ahab, that Ahab had God given authority to take Naboth's property?
kaufmannphillips wrote:
I do promote violence ... I promote violent intervention - if necessary - when a private individual buys a car elevator and neglects to act justly in meeting the needs of fellow citizens who are ill-clad and hungry and unhoused.
Where is it that God authorized you to do this? How do you know whether a person has been charitable "enough"? Do you have any definite standard apply, or are the criteria just made up as you go along?
kaufmannphillips wrote:
I do not promote stealing. I promote going right out in the bright light of day, shaming private individuals publicly, and seizing the resources that they have neglected to dispose of as they should. Nothing surreptitious about it.
Just because an individual possesses a good, does not mean that the good belongs to them.
Forcible reallocation of resources, as described above, is about coveting justice. It is injustice for one individual to withhold resources that should be used for the benefit of another. And the agent of justice will dispossess those who wrongfully possess, in order that others may rightfully possess
Sorry, you are guilty as charged - covetousness and stealing - you are violating both commands (Exo 20, Duet 5). I have never argued that ownership of property hinges merely on possession. Rather, property ownership hinges on the rather objective notions of consensual exchange (described above) and on
homesteading. Perhaps you could offer an alternative theory of property rights to escape my charge?
Where has G-d articulated, in comprehensive detail, the authority that he has given to Caesar, and the limitations that he has placed on Caesar's authority?