Here is my response. It is written somewhat in haste, so I hope I was not too impolite (it is principally impoliteness and sarcasm that I have to spend most of my time editing out of my polemical writings, when I have the time to do so). I can further edit it, if my readers feel that it is not in the right spirit. Let me know. I keep re-editing it.
It was too long to fit into one post (there are apparently set limits), so it continues on the next.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Response to Norman Geisler
By Steve Gregg
The genesis of this exchange began with a criticism that Norman Geisler wrote of partial preterism—a position upon which he took issue with his friend (and mine) Hank Hanegraaff—entitled,
"A Friendly Response to Hank Hanegraaff's Book, The Last Disciple" (see at
http://www.ses.edu/NormGeisler/lastdisciple.htm)
I read Geisler’s criticism of Hank’s position, but soon forgot about it, until a participant on our Bible forum requested that I answer Geisler’s article point-by-point. This I did, in order to accommodate my correspondent, and posted my responses on our web forum, in June of 2005 (found at
http://www.wvss.com/forumc/viewtopic.php?t=449 ).
Now, eighteen months later, the same correspondent who requested that I write my first response has informed me that Norm Geisler has responded to me and posted his response on his web page (
http://www.ses.edu/NormGeisler/lastdisciple_2.html ). I was asked to respond to the more recent Geisler piece.
In reading Dr. Geisler’s response to my points, I was not sure if there was anything new for me to respond to. The points he makes in criticizing my position are mostly repetitions of the same points he made against Hank—points that I already answered in my response—and Geisler has not really refuted my points, nor given much in the way of further support for his own. However, since Dr. Geisler apparently believes he has advanced the argument with his new piece, I will assume that others may share his opinion and may benefit from my response to him.
Dr. Geisler’s method of responding to arguments is quite different from my own. For one thing, in my response to him, I have pasted his own words directly into my document (in boldface type)—reproducing his arguments in context and in his own words. I simply attached my observations and criticisms below his actual paragraphs. By contrast, Geisler does not quote me at any length in his responses. He summarizes my statements in his own words, putting his own spin upon them. My context is omitted, and sometimes a single phrase of mine is retained and cast in a very different light from that in which my words originally appeared. Thus, he ends up not really responding to, nor even correctly representing my arguments. It seems to me that he merely ridicules the concepts he misunderstands. Why he misunderstands is a mystery to me. It often seems as if he did not really read or process my statements, but only scanned the page for concepts that he and his dispensational readers object to, and then ridicules them with standard dispensational rhetoric. I am sure he sees this differently, but in my estimation, he has not really answered my points or refuted anything by appeal to real biblical exegesis.
I have found myself in dialogue and debates with dispensationalists scores of times over the past 25 years. My observation from this experience would be that dispensational defenders cannot win on the basis of sound biblical exegesis, so they resort to three illegitimate tactics: 1) they ridicule or castigate what they cannot rationally refute; 2) they make up their own definitions of words, and 3) they impose upon biblical readers the duty of adopting arbitrary hermeneutical rules, which the biblical writers would never have recognized and with which they would not have complied. Take, for example, this classic case of definition manipulation, found in Dr. Geisler’s first criticism of my article:
First, Gregg wrongly assumes there is a difference between the “historical-grammatical” and “literal” method of interpretation. In fact, the Latin title for the view is sensus literalis (the literal sense). Preterists and amills often mis-characterize the literal method as leaving no room for symbols and figures of speech. This is simply false.
It is the dispensationalists, not their opponents, who mis-characterize the meaning of the word “literal.” Most English-speaking people use the word “literal” in the sense that the English dictionaries use it. The Oxford English Dictionary is not much different from all others I have consulted in defining “literal” as follows:
adjective 1. using or interpreting words in their usual or most basic sense without metaphor or allegory. 2. (of a translation) representing the exact words of the original text. 3. free from distortion. 4. informal absolute (used for emphasis). 5. relating to a letter or letters of the alphabet.
Of the five definitions given above, only the first relates to the task of interpretation (our present interest). Dispensationalists continually pretend that it is a mischaracterization of the word “literal” when we non-dispensationalists insist that this word leaves “no room for symbols and figures of speech.” Actually, this is the limitation that the authoritative dictionaries specifically place upon the word.
No matter how many hundreds of times dispensational scholars may repeat their mantra: “literal interpretation also leaves room for figures of speech,” they apparently have failed to convince the English lexicographers, so the dictionaries remain unchanged. The dispensationalists have not been authorized to reinvent the English language for the rest of us, so as to use their novel definitions to their own advantage in debate.
Furthermore, if their statement is true (i.e., that consistent “literal” interpretation allows for figures of speech to be interpreted idiomatically, not literally), then the very difference between themselves and those non-literalists, whose hermeneutic is alleged to be unorthodox, is entirely removed. If a literal hermeneutic includes making provision for non-literal figures of speech, then we are all, without distinction, using “the literal method” equally.
For example, when dispensationalists tell us that the catching up of John into heaven, in Revelation 4:1, represents the rapture of the church, they are not taking the passage “literally.” They are taking it allegorically. To say, “John represents the church going up,” is to use the language of allegory (as soon as you take John as “representing” something other than the man John, you have departed from literal interpretation—so why not just admit this? Is it embarrassing?).
Every time a dispensationalist repeats the common claim that the ‘seven spirits of God’ speak of the seven-fold Holy Spirit, he/she is taking the expression non-literally. Taken literally, the phrase speaks of seven spirits, and seeing it as a reference to seven distinct spirits would be the literal way of understanding it. Interpreting this phrase as a symbol of the Holy Spirit is quite all right. No one should be opposed to such interpretive conventions, when appropriate. What I oppose is the pretense that this can honestly be referred to as a “consistently literal interpretation.”
Of course, there is no rule in scripture (nor in the canons of common sense) that demands that the literal sense of a statement invariably must convey its intended meaning. The dispensationalists do not follow such a rule. Why do they criticize others for not following it?
To know that Dr. Geisler equates the phrase “grammatical-historical” with the Latin “sensus literalis” produces no valid support for the point he is arguing. The range of meaning of the Latin “literalis” is not identical to that of its modern English derivative “literal,” and Latin is not the language we are using in this discussion. When we say we are following a “literal interpretation,” we are speaking of certain rational processes and the logic employed in interpreting scripture. Our concern is with the process itself, not with Latin labels for the process.
Norm Geisler and I are writing for an English-speaking public. The word “literal,” when used in English, means what English dictionaries and English-speaking people recognize it to mean—not necessarily what its Latin root meant to the ancient Romans. For example, to recognize that the statement, “It’s raining cats and dogs,” is an idiom to be understood other than in its literal sense may or may not be consistent with whatever the Latins referred to as the “sensus literalis”—but when we are speaking English, we do not wish to confuse people by saying, “This statement should be taken literally.”
The same is true when the Bible speaks of Jesus as the “Lamb of God.” A literal “lamb” is not the same thing as a “man”—Jesus was “literally” the latter. He is the former only in a metaphorical sense. Dispensationalists suggest that they are still following a “literal approach” even when they recognize the presence of metaphors. But English dictionaries say that “literal” means “without metaphor.” So we should be able to admit (without the slightest embarrassment) that we do not take such a phrase as “Lamb of God” literally.
This does not in any sense render it impossible to take such a phrase seriously or to make good sense of it. It simply is not “literal.” A fact does not have to be stated in literal terms in order to be represented truthfully. When God repeatedly described Canaan as “a land flowing with milk and honey”—this was stating a truth, but not in literal terms. Recognizing the presence of a non-literal idiom does not hinder us from understanding the text as the writer intended it to be understood—in fact, it is a necessary prerequisite for reaching the correct understanding. Thus, taking “Lamb of God” non-literally is a necessary part of the grammatical-historical approach.
It is artificial to equate “grammatical-historical hermeneutics” with “literalism.” The two concepts have never been identical. Centuries prior to the advent of dispensationalism (1830), the grammatical-historical approach to scripture was associated with the methods of the reformers, like Luther, Calvin and Knox (all of whom were non-literalistic amillennialists). These biblical scholars never dreamed that the grammatical-historical method required them to follow the literalistic methods recommended by dispensationalists. These two ideas are not synonymous.
A fair description of the grammatical-historical method that would be universally accepted by all responsible exegetes would be very similar to that given by Professor Bruce Terry, Chair of the School of Biblical Studies at Ohio Valley University:
“The purpose in grammatical-historical exegesis is to understand to the extent possible the original intention of the author.” http://web.ovc.edu/terry/interpretation/exegesis.htm
This is the meaning of the term as I learned it and have found it to be used by scholars in the thirty seven years I have been studying and teaching the Bible (the first eight of which, I was teaching dispensationalism). If we take “grammatical-historical” to mean “the sense intended by the original writer,” this clearly is not the same thing as the “literal sense”—unless the writer under consideration intended his words to be taken in the literal sense.
It is plain that metaphors, symbols, idioms and apocalyptic imagery are commonly used in biblical books, all of which are to be understood according to their intended sense (i.e., metaphorically, symbolically, idiomatically, etc.), rather than literally.
Of course, dispensationalists actually do not follow a consistently-literal hermeneutic any more than do amillennialists (preterism actually follows a more literal hermeneutic to many passages than do most dispensationalists or amillennialists). Like everybody else, dispensationalists take some things literally, and some things figuratively. Their point of difference from others is in their idiosyncratic claim that, when they are taking something figuratively, they are still taking it “literally”!
Second, Gregg…fails to note that the word “resurrection” always means physical resurrection in Scripture and that Revelation 20:6 speaks of the “first resurrection.”
To suggest that I “failed to note” that the word “resurrection” is always (elsewhere) used of physical resurrection is to reveal that my esteemed critic did not read what I wrote very carefully. He had made this very point in his first article and I did not “fail to note” his point. In fact, I addressed his point, and took issue with his conclusions. My response to this point was apparently unanswerable, since he does not refute me, and apparently prefers to conceal what I said from his readers. Here are the relevant comments from my earlier article:
“The fact that the word ‘resurrection’ is not elsewhere (other than Revelation 20:5-6) used to speak of spiritual rebirth is no more significant than is the fact that the name ‘Jezebel’ was never elsewhere (apart from Revelation 2:20) used to designate anyone other than Ahab's wife. Revelation has many original features, vis-a-vis the rest of scripture.”
Ironically, Geisler was mistaken (and I was mistaken in taking his claims at face value without checking) in his very premise that “the word ‘resurrection’ always means physical resurrection.” This simply is not factually correct. There is an obvious example of “anastasis” (the word for “resurrection” in Revelation 20:5-6) being used elsewhere in scripture without any reference to physical resurrection (for the knowledge of which I am indebted to a correspondent at our web forum). Simeon said that Jesus would cause “the fall and the rising again (anastasis) of many in Israel” (Luke 2:34). This “falling” was not physical; nor was the “rising again.” The polarization that Jesus caused in Israel (also predicted by John the Baptist—Matt.3:10-12), resulted in the reprobates “falling” into calamity under God’s judgment (in AD 70), and the believing remnant “rising again” in regeneration (at Pentecost).
If one wishes to insist that the
anastasis in this verse is physical and literal, then he/she must also allow that the “falling” was physical as well.
Further, to deny Revelation 19 is about the Second Coming is to miss the very climax of the Book of Revelation itself.”
If the scholarly community with which my esteemed critic interacts is so in-bred as to mistake this statement for an argument, rather than recognizing it as a mere, unsubstantiated assertion of an opinion, then the task of dialoguing across the borders to one another will be more difficult than I had anticipated.
This is to say nothing of the final judgment scene of the “great white throne” in chapter 20 which did not occur in A.D. 70.
My esteemed critic certainly must know that I, like virtually all partial preterists, accept a futurist interpretation of the “great white throne judgment,” as he himself does.
I had written (contra Geisler) that even a person taking a full-preterist view of Revelation (he knows that I do not) could still, theoretically, believe—upon other grounds—in the future second coming of Christ. My point was that the Book of Revelation is not the only source of our information about the end of the world, and that, even if the book was not considered relevant to the subject (or even if it were not part of the New Testament canon at all), there is plenty of New Testament data elsewhere upon which to base our belief in the future resurrection and judgment.
That is the point I made in my article, which he is apparently attacking. My point is self-evidently true. His attack is, therefore, misguided. The disagreement between us is not about whether full-preterism is true or not (we both reject it). The point is whether we need to embrace any particular interpretation of the Book of Revelation in order to believe in the future second coming of Christ. One needs only to read the Thessalonian epistles to know that this would not be necessary.
This being the case, partial preterist[s] are inconsistent in using the references to “soon,” “shortly,” and “near” to refer to A.D. 70, for then they must admit that there is no future resurrection and Second Coming–which is the heretical view of full preterism.
My esteemed critic here continues to act as if he has not read the response that he is critiquing. This invalid claim (which he had made in his first article) was directly answered in my earlier response. For my reader’s convenience, I will paste my earlier comment below:
“[Recognition of some future elements in the Revelation while emphasizing the “soon” passages] is not as inconsistent as Geisler imagines, however, and is based on contextual and exegetical considerations in each passage. Nor does the prediction of a near fulfillment of the prophecies in the book necessarily have to apply to every prediction of the book. If a book was, say, 90% concerned with near events, and 10% occupied with distant events, one might justly say that that book should be heeded by the present generation because of the nearness of the fulfillment of its predictions (that is, the vast majority of them).”
As for Hebrews 10:37, Gregg offers only his “opinion” without reasons that it is about A. D. 70, when it is clearly about Christ’s Second Coming as both the language and context indicate. For it speaks about our “reward” and “heaven” (vv. 34-35).
My esteemed critic had used Hebrews 10:37 as proof of a point, taking it for granted that we all see this as a reference to the second coming of Christ. I was simply registering my disagreement on this passage, not arguing my point. Geisler had written as if he was unaware of other opinions about this verse, so I informed him of one person who does not follow his assumptions about it.
In my judgment, the reference to “reward in heaven” a couple of verses earlier, is not intended to turn the discussion in Hebrews 10 to the subject of eschatology. It is reflecting back on the convictions that had, at an earlier time, motivated the readers to cheerfully forfeit their earthly estates (i.e., because they knew they had greater rewards in heaven). It is the subject of the suffering believer’s rewards in another world, after death—not the second coming of Christ—that is being considered.
Third, if a prediction about an event hundreds of years yet in the future can be relevant to the readers (as Gregg admits about the resurrection/rapture), then there is no reason why distant predictions of how God will defeat evil and bring in everlasting righteousness cannot be relevant to the immediate generation to whom the prophecy was first given. No matter how distant Christ Second Coming is, it is relevant to our lives today, just as the predictions about His First Coming were relevant to Old Testament saints, even though they were made hundreds of years in advance. Paul comforts the Thessalonians with the prediction of the resurrection of loved ones which is already nearly 2000 years later and still not fulfilled (1 Thes. 4:13-18). So, contrary to Gregg, this does not make God a “tease.”
I agree that God is no “tease” when He tells us that someday Jesus will come back and right all wrongs. This is the blessed hope of the believer, and everyone that has this hope in him purifies himself, even as He is pure. God has not indicated when this shall happen, and it remains always a future hope.
Where it would be difficult not to see God as a “tease” would be if He were to tell suffering Christians in the first century that their enemies will be judged “shortly” and that this is “about to happen” and that the time is “near”—but where he secretly means that this will not occur for over two-thousand years, and that none of this will really have anything to do with their vindication over their present persecutors at all.
Fourth, as for Rev. 22:10, Gregg totally overlooks our point that Daniel’s prediction was not fulfilled in John’s day because John was not told it was fulfilled in his day but only that it could now be understood by those who read it.
It did not strike me as consequential—nor does it now. Sorry.
But even Gregg has to admit this interpretation is “possible,” and his rejection of it is on the subjective grounds that he finds it “unconvincing” and “awkward."
Yes, I am generous enough to say that some dispensational assumptions are theoretically “possible”—even if I see no probability of their being correct. In this respect, I am far more generous than is my esteemed critic, who does not even acknowledge the possibility of any interpretation other than his own being correct—despite the novelty of his own position in terms of historic Christian beliefs.
Actually, Dr. Geisler cannot possibly know how “subjective” I am being in finding his interpretations “unconvincing” or “awkward,” since I have made no effort to present my reasons. I must assume that he is entirely unfamiliar with my teaching or reasoning methods, apart from the brief comments I made in assessing his arguments.
Fifth, Gregg reveals his hermeneutical colors when he rejects the literal nature of the plaques in Revelation claiming they are “apocalyptic” in contrast to the other similar biblical plagues like those on Pharaoh that were admittedly “historical.” The root problem with preterism, of both kinds, is the rejection of a consistent application of the historical-grammatical method of interpretation.
I do not reject “a consistent application of the historical-grammatical method of interpretation.” What I reject is “a consistent application of the literal method of interpretation.” We could save ourselves many tedious keystrokes if this "literal" red herring could be eliminated from the discussion.
It is frustrating that Dr. Geisler presents a digest of my comments without their context, making it sound as if I had not already anticipated this objection. These are my previous remarks, to which he is responding:
“The reason one can take the plagues of Egypt literally and those in Revelation figuratively is that these are two very different kinds of literature. Exodus is a historical narrative, whereas Revelation is an apocalyptic prophecy. The former genre is expected to use literal language to describe historical events; the latter uses symbolism, which echo significant historical events (like the plagues of Egypt) in order to get across its message.”
My esteemed critic is right in saying that I reveal my hermeneutical colors here. That is because I am forthright in explaining what hermenteutic I am employing, and how it is justified. The only difference between Dr. Geisler and myself, in this respect, is that he never honestly reveals his hermenteutical colors. To please fellow dispensationalists, he professes loyalty to a “literal” hermeneutic, but when it comes to actually interpreting specific non-literal biblical phrases and imagery, he (like every sensible person) proceeds to interpret non-literally, as common sense would often dictate. He and I follow essentially similar hermeneutic procedures (with incidental differences). Unlike me, he simply gives his hermenteutical commitments a deceptive label.
Amazingly, Gregg believes that in the same “Olivet Discourse” there are many “genres [which] call for a different hermeneutic.” Indeed, he suggests there are three different hermeneutics in this one passage–part is “literal language, part is apocalyptic language, and part is parabolic”! No wonder preterism engenders such confusion.
Let me get this straight...preterism engenders confusion because its advocates see value in recognizing differences between widely-differing genres in literatrure?
It is disconcerting to hear the Dean of a Christian institution of higher education, admitting that he thinks it confusion-engendering to engage in the basic hermeneutical task of genre identification. What kind of scholars must such institutions produce, if their students are discouraged from identifying the genre of the material they are seeking to interpret, for fear that they might find such a discipline “confusing”?
Of course, every intelligent person recognizes many genre distinctions intuitively, so that different canons of interpretation are instinctively applied to historical reporting, poetry, technical writing, fictional novels, etc. Geisler himself certainly must recognize these distinctions, in his general reading, else he would be forced to reach conclusions about certain passages that even he would recognize as absurd.
It has not been my experience or observation that preterism engenders more confusion than does dispensationalism. I believe there are a greater variety of opinions in the latter camp than in the former. As for the confusing nature of my criticized comments, here they are, pasted directly from my earlier response:
“As for the question of how one can be consistent in taking part of the Olivet Discourse literally, and part non-literally, I think I addressed that above: part of the discourse is literal language, part is apocalyptic language, and part is parabolic. Each of these genres call for a different hermeneutic, but it is not really confusing, but actually more or less intuitive, once the separate genres are identified.”
My esteemed critic finds it possible only to ridicule this paragraph. Apparently, offering a refutation would be asking too much. I pointed out that the discourse in Matthew (like similar passages in the Old Testament prophets) has much in it that can be understood literally (e.g., predictions of persecution, wars, false messiahs and false prophets), and that a few verses are expressed in an apocalyptic style, characteristic of many prophetic passages. The third genre is that of the five parables at the end of chapter 24 and all of chapter 25. Is there anything faulty with my observations here? If I have represented the case correctly, why ridicule my statement? Is my esteemed critic saying that he applies the same “literal” hermeneutic to the parables at the end as he does to the events predicted earlier in the discourse? Does he take the ten virgins as ten literal women? If so, how does he justify such counterintuitive “consistency”?
Sixth, like other preterist[s] Gregg has difficulty with the fact that many of the earliest Fathers rejected this view.
Actually, I have no difficulty with this at all. Why does Dr. Geisler say that I do? The writings of the fathers, to which he refers, disagree with his view as well as with mine. Does my esteemed critic “have difficulty” with that fact (other than the difficulty he finds in acknowledging it, I mean)?
Indeed, Ireaneaus who knew the apostle John’s disciple Polycarp rejected preterism, as did Victorinus and Eusebius after him. . .Likewise, for his own private anti-patristic and allegoristic interpretation of these events, he dismissed a continuous strain of Fathers from just after the apostles through the fourth century who were opposed to preterism.
What could be more disingenuous than for a dispensationalist to make this criticism? The same fathers who (as my esteemed critic puts it) “rejected preterism” and “were opposed to preterism” (as though Geisler thinks they had heard of preterism, weighed it and found it wanting!) had precisely the same “opposition” to dispensationalism. They had never heard of either viewpoint. Does saying nothing about a topic of which one has never heard constitute “rejecting”?
Dr. Geisler will not permit preterists to think independently of the church fathers on the subject of the Book of Revelation, while he and other dispensationalists utterly ignore or reject the teachings of the same early fathers on many major eschatological issues! My esteemed critic himself dismisses that “continuous strain of Fathers from just after the apostles through the fourth century” whose unambiguous teachings included “replacement theology,” the future persecution of the church by antichrist, the predicted rise of the “Lawless One” immediately upon the fall of the Roman Empire, and many other non-dispensational positions. For reasons not disclosed, Dr. Geisler gives himself permission to disagree with these fathers. The only reason he thinks it audacious of me to disagree with them is that I also happen to disagree with him.
(Incidentally, Eusebius, whom Geisler mentions above, was an amillennialist, and minced no words in condemning premillennialism as “heresy.”)
Seventh, Gregg points to early signs of apostasy in the NT as evidence against the argument that John wrote Revelation late. But this overlooks several import facts. There was nearly a generation between the time of Christ and the apostasy that characterized the church of Paul’s, Peter’s, and Jude’s epistles. Likewise, there is nearly another generation between the 60s and Domitian’s reign under which John wrote. Despite local problems earlier, the general character of the churches in Revelation differs significantly from those before A.D. 70.
This argument seems to be saying that the churches addressed in Revelation required about a generation from their founding to leave their first love and to become lukewarm and compromised. He says that I have “overlooked” the fact that it took Paul’s churches a generation to get into trouble. I overlooked no such thing. In fact, I directly refuted it. It did not take a generation (or even a year!) for the churches at Galatia and Corinth to get themselves into errors every bit as serious as those of the churches addressed in Revelation. I pointed this out in my previous response. My esteemed critic apparently “overlooked” it.
Eighth, Gregg speaks against the literal interpretation as “a low view of prophesy” that claims a “prophet cannot discuss future developments before they arise.” Yet he seems blissfully unaware that this is precisely what the preterist[s] do with Matthew 24-25 and the bulk of the Book of Revelation.
I never made any such statement about the “literal interpretation” of prophecy, and it is perplexing to try to imagine how Dr. Geisler came to think that I did. My comments were not part of our discussion of literal interpretation, but we were discussing the date of writing of the Book of Revelation.
My esteemed critic, in his earlier criticism of Hank, had advanced the theory that imperial persecutions did not occur prior to Domitian’s reign as an argument for the late date of Revelation. I responded that this argument (which has nothing to do with literalism) reflected a “low view of prophecy.” This is because this particular argument for the late date depends entirely on the assumption that Revelation cannot be predictive. It is similar to the fallacious argument that Isaiah could not have written about Cyrus before that man was born.
Dr. Geisler does not seem to have noticed that he was repeating a late-date argument for Revelation that only works for non-evangelical non-futurists (he is both an evangelical and a futurist). Here is how this common argument goes:
1. Revelation is describing the current situation in John’s own day (not a future situation);
2. Revelation 13 describes the Imperial persecution of Christians throughout the Roman Empire;
3. There was no such empire-wide persecution prior to Domitian;
4. Therefore John is describing the Domitianic persecutions;
Therefore, (based upon the non-evangelical assumption that John could not possibly be describing events that had not yet materialized)—
5. John could not have written during Nero’s reign, nor any time earlier Domitian’s persecutions.
The problem with Geisler’s use of this classic liberal argument is that he personally only accepts points 3 and 5. As a futurist, he does not believe points 1, 2 or 4 (without which, point 5 does not follow as a necessary conclusion). Dispensationalists believe that the “beast” is a future individual—not the Roman emperor who was contemporary with John—so they cannot use this argument at all. My esteemed critic appears to have parroted an (incidentally invalid) argument from the textbooks of people who reject his position, without first checking to see whether the argument works for his viewpoint.
My original point was that those who do use this argument (namely those who think Revelation 13 is about the Domitianic persecutions) to prove that Revelation could not have been written earlier than Domitian’s time, are making non-evangelical assumptions—namely that John could not have written prophetically about a future Domitianic persecution 25 years prior to its occurrence (say, in A.D. 69). This assumes that Revelation cannot contain actual predictive prophecies. Such an argument should be rejected by all evangelicals, along with the similarly-reasoned argument that Daniel could not have been written before the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, since Daniel wrote about him.
If my esteemed critic would like to show how this argument works without invoking the non-evangelical assumptions mentioned above, I would be very interested in hearing his logic.
Ninth, Gregg dismisses the cumulative weight of ten arguments for the late date of Revelation (which strongly opposes preterism), using statements like “How do we know?” “This is not self-evident” and “This is as subjective as the previous point.” But he provides no definitive response to any objection or to the overall weight of all the objections to an early date for Revelation.
Again, to say I find the arguments to be fallacious and unconvincing is not the same thing as “dismiss[ing]” them without consideration. My esteemed critic makes it sound as if I give ten solid arguments a cavalier dismissal, when in fact, I addressed the weakness of each argument and recommended, for a fuller treatment of the same arguments, the introduction of my book and also Kenneth Gentry’s). Contra Dr. Geisler’s suggestion, ten fallacious arguments do not add up to one strong argument. My esteemed opponent would recognize this fact instinctively, were he presented with ten flimsy arguments for, say, the documentary hypothesis. A value of zero-times-ten is still zero.
And, unlike the futurists view, preterism is completely dependent on an early date for the Book of Revelation. Hence, the strong evidence for a late date for Revelation (after A.D. 70) is a strong argument against preterism.
I have always acknowledged that the greatest weakness of the preterist position is its absolute dependence upon the early date of writing for Revelation. While neither the early nor the late date can be proven beyond question, yet the arguments for the late date are not compelling, and the abundance of good peripheral arguments in favor of preterism tend to add additional weight to the already adequate case for an early date.
Tenth, he wrongly argues that several possible literal interpretations of a passages, as futurists have of some texts, is justification for preterists taking different allegorical interpretations of these literal events. This is an insightful example of a false analogy.
I sought no such justification. I was simply turning my esteemed critic’s argument back on himself. He seemed to imply that the diversity of opinions among preterists indicates the invalidity of the general position. I merely pointed out that there is an even higher degree of disagreement among dispensationalists. I was not seeking a “justification” for using an “allegorical interpretation.” I was saying that what Dr. Geisler thinks disqualifies preterism (i.e., differences of opinions among its advocates) would equally disqualify dispensationalism. However, I don’t think that either view is disqualified by the variety of opinions held among its advocates. If one view or another is to be disqualified, it must be on the basis of scriptural exegesis.
As a sidebar: neither I, nor any modern amillennialist or preterist, ever employ what can properly be called an “allegorical” interpretation of any passage in order to establish our eschatology. Dispensationalists (apparently perpetuating this mistake by merely quoting each other) have continually referred to the approach of amillennialists as the “allegorizing” hermenteutic, known to be characteristic of Origen’s writings (whom they decry as unorthodox).
I should have thought they would be better informed. “Allegorizing” is a specific approach to scriptural stories that was taken by many rabbis, by Philo, and (in the Christian movement) by members of the Alexandrian School, like Origen. This approach actually bears no resemblance to any method followed by any modern evangelical scholar in establishing doctrine.
Dispensationalists are so committed to asserting their loyalty to a “literal” hermeneutic, that they apparently have not familiarized themselves with the variety of ways in which a passage can be taken non-literally. The allegorical method was certainly one non-literal approach among many, but it has nothing whatsoever to do with preterist or amillennial methodologies.
When we read that a sower sowed seeds, and then learn that the story was not about literal seeds, but that seeds were symbolic of the word of God being preached, we are interpreting the story non-literally. But this is not the allegorical method. It is parable—a different non-literal way of speaking, commonly employed by the prophets and by Jesus.
When we read, in Revelation, that the whole world worships an animal having seven heads and ten horns, which eventually makes war against a Lamb, and then we later learn that the animal is not an animal at all, nor are the heads really heads but mountains, nor are the horns really horns, but kings, nor is the Lamb actually a literal lamb—we realize that we are again reading non-literal material, and will err if we interpret literally. But this is neither allegory nor parable, but apocalyptic symbolism.
Yet another form of non-literal interpretation, legitimized by it appearance in the writings of the New Testament, is “typological” interpretation. The recollection of Israel’s exodus from Egypt (in Hosea 11:1) is seen, by Matthew, as “fulfilled” in the coming of the infant Jesus out of Egypt—apparently recognizing Israel’s experience as a “type” of the Messiah’s. There is no way that this can be said to be a “literal” interpretation of Hosea 11:1. It is typological.
When we read, in Isaiah, that God will lay in Zion a foundation stone, and then we read, in 1 Peter 2:6, that this is not referring to a stone at all, but that it refers to Jesus, and the “Zion” of which He is “the foundation” is not the literal mountain in Israel, but is the church—again we find we are dealing with non-literal language and should interpret non-literally. This, however, is not a case of parable, allegory or apocalyptic, but the stone and Zion are understood “spiritually.” Thus we are expected to “spiritualize” the passage, as did the New Testament writers:
“But you have come to Mount Zion and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem…to the general assembly and church of the firstborn who are registered in heaven…” (Hebrews 12:22-23)
"Allegorizing" is an entirely different method from those surveyed above. In many cases, the allegorist sees, in a simple story, many seemingly unrelated and unwarranted philosophical correspondences. Some examples of the kind of allegorization practiced by some Jewish teacher of Jesus’ day are given in the Jewish Encyclopedia:
"Men versed in natural philosophy explain the history of Abraham and Sarah in an allegorical manner with no inconsiderable ingenuity and propriety. The man here [Abraham] is a symbolical expression for the virtuous mind, and by his wife is meant virtue, for the name of his wife is Sarah ["princess"], because there is nothing more royal or more worthy of regal preeminence than virtue" ("De Abrahamo," xx. 8; ed. Mangey, ii. 15).
“[Josephus’] symbolical exposition of the Tabernacle with its utensils, and of the high priest's vestments ("Ant." iii. 7, § 7), and his interpretation that the Holy of Holies means the heavens, the showbread means the twelve months, and the candlestick means the seven planets, resemble Philo, but are merely resemblances. Similar explanations are repeatedly given by the Midrash…”
“The following is an illustration [of Philo’s allegorizations] from Genesis: ‘God planted a garden in Eden [Gen. ii. 5 et seq.]: that means God implants terrestrial virtue in the human race. The tree of life is that specific virtue which some people call goodness. The river that 'went out of Eden' is also generic goodness. Its four heads are the cardinal virtues; 'Pheison' is derived from the Greek ???????? (I abstain) and means 'prudence'; and, being an illustrious virtue, it is said 'to compass the whole land of Havilah where there is gold.'" The name "Gihon" means "chest" (see Gen. R. on the passage) and stands for courage, and it compasses Ethiopia, or humiliation. Tigris is "temperance"; the name is connected with a tiger because it resolutely opposes desire. Euphrates means "fertility" (Hebrew parah; see Gen. R.) and stands for "justice." In this way the patriarchs, however, are allegorized away into mere abstractions ("De Allegoriis Legum," i. 19 et seq.; ed. Mangey, i. 56 et seq.).”
(above examples from
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view. ... 6&letter=A)
Some ancient Christian writers—notably those of the Alexandrian School, like Origen—also employed a similar allegorizing method. However, no modern biblical exegete follows such a method, to my knowledge.
Milder forms of allegorizing were not unknown among the apostolic writings. Paul allegorized the story of Ishmael and Isaac—making their mothers to represent the two covenants, and the boys to represent the unbelieving Jews and the Christians, respectively (Galatians 4:22-31). He also took the law of not muzzling the ox and applied it allegorically to the rights of ministers, as though this were its primary meaning in the original law (1 Cor.9:9-10/ 1 Tim.5:17-18). He seems also to allegorize the law that forbids plowing with an ox and an ass together, when he writes: “Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (2 Cor.6:14). However, these cases did not follow such an arbitrary approach as did Philo and Origen. Paul’s practice simply saw a spiritual principle in the Old Testament example, and applied the same principle to New Testament truth.
Preterists and amillennialists, as well as dispensationalists, take many things non-literally, but I have never encountered an example of allegorizing in any of their theological polemics. Dispensationalists are fond of linking the amillennialists’ hermeneutics to “the allegorizing method of the non-orthodox Origen.” In continually making this association, dispensationalists demonstrate either their lack of familiarity with the hermeneutics of the evangelical amillennialist, or unfamiliarity with those of Origen—probably both.
Eleventh, it is amusing that Gregg uses a third century heretical teacher, Origen, as a basis for his amillennial view and dismisses earlier second century orthodox Fathers as a basis for futurism… He summarily dismisses all this with a vague “for all anyone can say” and a guilt-by-association with the Word of Faith movement!
My comparison of Pseudo-Ephraem with Origen was neither invalid nor particularly amusing. My point: One could as easily prove that the early church was amillennial by appeal to the non-orthodox Origen as to prove that the early church believed in a pre-trib rapture by appeal to the questionable “Pseudo-Ephraem.” I call Pseudo-Ephraem “questionable” for a number of reasons.
Scholars are not agreed that the Syrian, Ephraem of Nisibis, of the fourth century, wrote this document—which is why they call it “Pseudo-Ephraem.”
Even if this sermon was indeed written by Ephraem, in the third century, and even if he did teach a two-stage coming of Christ (both of which are debatable), the document’s teaching does not appear to reflect the same eschatological opinion as that of the other contemporary fathers. In other words, Ephraem (like Darby, 1400 years later) may well have espoused his own idiosyncratic opinions, contrary to the classic teachings of the mainstream church.
My comparison with the word of faith teaching was not intended as a gratuitous insult, but as an apt analogy. If a book by Kenneth Hagin were to be discovered by scholars a thousand years from now, it would be a mistake on their part to assume that this book had represented the majority view of the church in the twentieth century.
That was the simple point I was making. It did not even remotely resemble a case of “guilt by association.” There was, in my remark, no suggestion of guilt, nor any element of association. The fact that my esteemed critic thought of it that way raises serious questions about either his willingness or his ability to understand a simple argument.
Further, contrary to Gregg, Renald Showers (in Maranatha, Our Lord, Come!) has demonstrated that the very earliest Fathers believed in an imminent coming of Christ, not just the fourth century Ephraem.
It’s a little late in the game for dispensationalists to try to prove such a point by appeal to “the earliest Fathers,” unless some new “Fathers” have been dug up that I have never heard of. It has been abundantly demonstrated by scholars studying these same fathers that they believed the Roman Empire had yet to fall and the Man of Lawlessness was yet to arise and persecute the church. There is no way that a man can believe such things and also be teaching that the actual second coming is imminent (a word meaning, “something that could happen at any moment”).
This is to say nothing of the inspired writings of the NT which proclaim Christ’s imminent return repeatedly (Jn. 14:1-3; 1 Cor. 1:7-8; 15:51-53; 16:22; Phil. 3:20-21; 4:5; Col. 3:4; 1 Thes. 1:10; 2:19; 4:13-18; 5:9, 23; 2 Thes. 2:1; 1 Tim. 6:14; 2 Tim. 4:1; Titus 2:13; Heb. 9:28; Jas. 5:7-9; 1 Pet. 1:7, 13; 1 Jn. 2:28-3:2; Jude 21; Rev. 2:25; 3:10; 22:7, 12, 20 ). Passages like “The Lord is at hand” (Phil. 4:5) and “the coming of the Lord is at hand” (Jas.5:8) can hardly mean anything other than imminent, unless one is a full preterist and denies a literal future Second Coming, claiming Christ returned in the first century.”
Many of the verses cited (though perhaps not all) do refer to a future coming of Christ. But what words or phrases in any of them suggest that Christ might come at any minute? Appeal to the actual words in a proof-text is an essential aspect of biblical argumentation—an aspect too frequently neglected in dispensational polemics. The presentation of the actual biblical words that allegedly support his point (if such words exist) would be helpful in establishing its validity.
If the apostles believed that Jesus could come at any moment, as Dr. Geisler is suggesting, then why did Paul so vehemently deny it in 2 Thessalonians 2:1-3?
Twelfth, after rejecting the early Fathers who were opposed to preterism, Gregg inconsistently appeals to the early Fathers to justify his amillennial views. He speaks of the pretrib beliefs before Ephraem in the fourth century as unsupported by earlier Fathers. Yet, he criticizes futurist who use the early Fathers to support their view.
Appeal to church fathers is a tricky business. Everybody appeals to them when doing so supports their views, and everybody reserves the right to disagree with them when in disagreement with their views. I simply appeal to the amillennialism of certain early fathers to counter the dispensationalist’ false assertions that the early church was uniformly premillennial. I am making no other point. I would not suggest that the agreement of these fathers proves amillennialism to be correct. My opinions do not depend upon the writings of the church fathers, but upon more primitive and inerrant authorities.
Thirteenth, he rejects the dispensational belief in a literal restoration of Israel which is firmly based in the historical-grammatical interpretation of Scripture (see Geisler, ibid., chap. 15). Yet he claims to hold the historical-grammatical hermeneutic.
That a belief in the future restoration of ethnic Israel is a necessary result of consistently following the grammatical-historical method of interpretation is merely one opinion. Luther and Calvin both advocated the grammatical-historical method, and neither saw in scripture any basis for such a restoration of the nation Israel. Stating an opinion is not the same thing as presenting a reasoned rebuttal. I reserve the right to continue to disagree with dispensational belief on this matter (without the slightest embarrassment) until a satisfactory rebuttal is forthcoming.
Fourteenth, Gregg makes the shocking statement that “to spiritualize the first resurrection may indeed be a violation of some arbitrary, humanly devise[d] ‘literal...method of interpretation,’ but what of it?” First of all, the literal method is not humanly devised nor arbitrary. It is an undeniable method of interpretation since one cannot deny it without using it.
Since there are various methods of interpretation other than the literal, and since no biblical writer tells us that we must use the literal approach at all times (in fact, the biblical writers themselves neglect it as often as not), then I think it not inappropriate to call the dispensationalist’s demand that we use no other method to be a “made-made” rule. If the rule was not made by men, then who made it—God? Can my esteemed critic, or anyone else, point out where God communicated such a rule for the interpretation of scripture? If such a rule has no divine sanction, then why would it be inappropriate (“shocking”) to describe the rule as “man-made”? If the rule does have divine sanction, can anyone explain why the apostles felt justified in their frequent violation of it?
So, the literal method of interpretation is literally undeniable. Here again, the root problem of preterism is laid bare. To use its own word, their interpretations of prophesy [sic] “spiritualize” a lot of prophecy. Incredibly, Gregg brushes off the inconsistency of taking one resurrection literally in the same passage which uses the same words to describe both resurrections by appealing to another passage in a different context that is talking about regeneration (Eph. 2:1), not resurrection.
I must wonder whether my esteemed critic even attempts to understand an argument before seeking to answer it. The point I made was that Paul (like Jesus—John 5:24), without using the actual word “resurrection,” often speaks of regeneration in the language of resurrection—“you who were dead…he has made alive” and “have passed from death unto life.” Regeneration was thus described, by Jesus and Paul, as a sort of spiritual resurrection, or a resurrection “in Christ”—using the same terminology that is commonly used of the physical resurrection.
This is what amillennialists believe John’s “first resurrection” (Rev.20:5-6) is referring to. There is nothing irrational or inconsistent about such a conclusion, even if my esteemed critic doesn’t agree with it. Dr. Geisler himself asserts that Revelation 20:11-13 describes a “resurrection,” even though he admits that the word “resurrection” is not used there.
Even more strangely, he uses another text which is speaking about two literal resurrections (Jn. 5:28f) of the “dead” bodies “in the graves” which will “come forth” at the command of Christ to justify that there is only one physical resurrection.
Even more strangely, my esteemed critic thinks that John 5:28f speak of two separate physical resurrections, divided by an interim of 1007 years—despite the fact that the referenced passage places the resurrection of “those who have done good” and of “those who have done evil” in the same “hour.” What then has become of literal interpretation?
He ignores the sound exegesis of George Ladd (in The Blessed Hope), who is not a dispensationalist, but who demonstrates that Revelation 20 is speaking about two literal resurrections. Indeed, the very historical-grammatical hermeneutic which Gregg claims to embrace demands such an interpretation.
I have read and carefully considered Ladd’s treatment of Revelation 20, in three of his books. I have not “ignored” his exegesis. I simply believe it is flawed—dispensationalist or not.
My esteemed critic is in the habit of saying that someone who is not impressed with arguments for his positions has “ignored” or “dismissed” those arguments. I have never encountered a preterist teacher who is ignorant of the arguments for dispensationalism. Many preterists, like myself, have themselves come out of a background of teaching dispensationalism for many years, and those who were never into that theology have usually studied dispensational writings extensively and prove their acquaintance with them by their precise interaction with the arguments of the opposing view.
Such cannot be said about most of the dispensationalists I have encountered—including, apparently, my esteemed opponent in this debate. It would be truly refreshing to encounter a dispensationalist who actually has taken the effort to understand what is being said by those taking the historically-held view of scripture (amillennialism).
Fifteenth…To show how blinded one can be by his own hermeneutical presuppositions, Gregg claims “there is no meaning of Revelation 20 plainer than the amillennial one.”
My actual statement, in context, speaks for itself. What I wrote was:
“However, once one has become free from the constraints of an arbitrary, literalistic, dispensational hermeneutic, and is at liberty to let scripture interpret scripture, there is no meaning of Revelation 20 plainer than the amillennial one.”
Where, in this statement, is the “blindness” to which my esteemed critic refers?
Nothing could be further from the fact, since the same phrase “lived again” is used by the same author in the same text, one before and one after the “thousand years.” And Gregg admits it is a literal resurrection.
Yes, I do admit that the living again after the thousand years is referring to the physical resurrection. However, the word Dr. Geisler translates as “lived again” is best translated simply as “lived,” sometimes having the connotation of “living-on,” or continuing to live, and other times suggesting the concept of “living again.” Apart from Revelation 20, there are two other occurrences in Revelation of this verb, in the same tense, one of which could be translated “lived again” or “came to life” (2:8), and one which can most reasonably be translated “lived-on” (13:14). I take the word in the latter sense in Revelation 20:4, and in the former sense in Revelation 20:5. Why would this be more inconsistent than taking the same word one way in Revelation 2:8 and another in Revelation 13:14?
Further, the two resurrections are said to be separated by “a thousand years,” a term used six times in five verses. Finally, the “thousand years” has a beginning and an end that is “finished.” The bookends of this literal time period are said to be two different literal events, one of which is called “the first resurrection.” Oddly enough, the amills take this to be the spiritual one (when the term “resurrection” is never used spiritually in the NT), and the other resurrection (which is not even called that as such) they believe is the literal resurrection.
For unexplained reasons, my esteemed critic keeps inserting the word “literal” where the text does not. It would be legitimate for him to say, “I take these references literally,” but it is quite another thing to say, “the texts says there will be a literal such-and-such.” Dr. Geisler asserts that the time period is “literal” and that the bookends around it are “two different literal events.” This is another instance of mere assertion, not argumentation from evidence. Argumentation requires the presentation of evidence for one’s position regarding the disputed point. Mere assertion provides no evidence. It simply “begs the question”—that is, it assumes as a starting point for an argument the very thing that is under dispute in the debate.
An example of this begging the question is the parenthetical remark, “Oddly enough, the amills take this to be the spiritual one (when the term ‘resurrection’ is never used spiritually in the NT).” To avoid begging the question, the parenthetical clause should read, “when the term ‘resurrection’ is never used spiritually
ELSEWHERE in the NT.” This would present his point in its proper light. The reader is then left to assess whether the absence of other uses of “resurrection” non-physically in the New Testament is likely (or not) to determine whether it is used thus in the Book of Revelation—a book which breaks many precedents in usage (e.g., where else, but in Revelation 11:8, is Jerusalem ever called “Egypt”?).
However, as observed earlier, the same word “resurrection” (anastasis) is in fact used of a non-physical resurrection, in Luke 2:34.
What is most striking about Geisler’s paragraph, above, is that he is willing to take the reference to the dead being summoned to the great white throne as synonymous with a second “resurrection” (though that word, as he admits, is not used there), but he is not willing to allow amillennialists to see references to “passing from death unto life” (John 5:24) or of our being “made alive” from the “dead” (Ephesians 2:1) as synonyms for “the first resurrection”—upon the grounds that the word “resurrection” is not used in Ephesians 2 or in John 5:24. Either the dead rising is the same thing as “resurrection,” or it is not. It can’t be so for the dispensationalist without permitting it to be so for alternative views as well.
And perish the thought of what the preterist could do with the historicity of early Genesis or of the Gospels if they would ever become consistent with their allegorical interpretation!
Amen to that! Any preterist who would inflexibly adhere to the same hermeneutic, regardless of the genre of the passages considered, would be making the same basic error as do the dispensationalists. Fortunately, preterists are not chained to an artificial rule that requires them to apply the same standards of interpretation, regardless what the author’s chosen means of communication may have been. Those of us who are unwilling to allow the dispensationalists to impose artificial rules upon us are free to think clearly enough to adopt the proper hermeneutic to fit the respective genres found in scripture.
Sixteenth, to borrow his own term, Gregg becomes “dislodged from reality” by denying that “orthodoxy is dependant on a proper literal...interpretation of the Bible.” How one can consistently hold orthodox theology on any other basis[?] Take for example the unquestioned orthodox belief in the literal death and literal resurrection of Christ. How can one derive this from Scripture with anything but a proper literal interpretation of Scripture? And yet by the same non-literal method of interpreting prophecy used by preterist, one would have to deny the orthodox teaching of the literal death and resurrection of Christ.
Yes, “by the same non-literal method of interpreting prophecy,” one would have to deny the orthodox teaching of the literal death and resurrection of Christ”—but preterists do not apply the same non-literal method when interpreting historical narrative as they use in interpreting poetic and symbolic statements. Can anyone say why they should?