Backwoodsman, states:
I think you're confusing this simple grammatical point with a theological statement about the nature of God. If you can separate the two in your thinking, I think both will become much clearer.
Your statement is very representative of the kind of ISBE confusion I’m talking about. For in claiming that I’m
confusing a “simple grammatical point” with “a theological statement about the nature of God”, you thus place the two in mutual exclusion of the other, thus implicitly claiming that the “simple grammatical point” has nothing to do with a “theological statement about the nature of God.” But, pray tell, what else besides theological statements about the nature of God do we have which defines “God” for us? That is, what else besides these are comprehendible? For any statement about God’s existence, moral dimension, potential for good or evil, creator-hood, person-hood, and so forth, are, in fact, the only kind of statements able to be understood. In fact, all such that I list
are theological statements about the nature of God. Therefore (following your logic) any other “points” (i.e. ‘statements’) that lay outside these comprehendible statements are by definition
not comprehendible, which is exactly why you’re
still failing to answer the question: “God is one
what?” For to simply assert that God is one “Yahweh” and one “Lord” begs the question what “Yahweh” and “Lord” mean according to your system, since as “simple grammatical point[s]” you claim they cannot be “theological statement[s] about the nature of God”.
And yet I can’t imagine you will let my charge stand. For that would mean you admit to a contradiction. But, at least, I hope to be spared the kind of response so typical of e.g., the Calvinist, wherein he posits his theological version of the Hegelian dialectic (doublethink), containing a thesis and an antithesis (i.e. like your pitting against each other the phrases “this simple grammatical point” and “theological statement[s] about the nature of God”), only to ultimately declare the truth is a synthesis of the two. In other words, I’m expecting your next response to be something akin to the claim that I don’t understand your position at all, or that I’m putting words into your mouth and being silly, etc. For the trick of the Hegelian dialectical method is to embrace the synthesis of opposing ideas, but then deny doing so. And so on,
ad infinitum.
For the ironic result of your statement quoted above is, instead of you yourself “separating” the two (thesis and antithesis) to produce clarity, you have thrown the two together, as if their synergistic
effect (read
confusion), will overcome their contradiction. You can believe that, if you want. But in my opinion a “point” has to mean something if it to be called a “point.” And I do not see how your utilization of the word “point” in the phrase “this simple grammatical
point” can mean anything at all, since, again, your guidelines insist that such a “point” can express nothing about the nature of God.
The problem here is that you are embracing a logical contradiction but refusing to admit it. I don’t think that’s quite playing fair. Rather, if I found myself taking your position I would admit to the contradiction but press the fact that Gödel’s incompleteness theory has proved that every ideological system [biblical Christianity included] runs into the wall of logical contradiction at some point, and so has to accept by faith certain axioms it cannot prove. Within Christian doctrine the eternality of a God who nevertheless acts is one such axiom, since, theoretically, Zeno’s paradox shows that if between any two points in time there are infinite points of time, movement (including that of the will, i.e.
Choice) should be impossible. And so there are (at least) a few axioms in biblical Christianity that defy logic as we humans understand it, yet apparently these axioms make sense to God. I think in essence this is your position—that the Trinity defies human logic but that Scripture shows it to be linguistically valid.
So why don’t I agree? Because in this case it seems that such a position takes the great majority of awkward phrases in the Bible—specifically, those in the O.T. involving the combination of Elohim with the singular verb—and insists that Elohim be translated in the singular, even at the expense of the more plainly understood phrases in the New Testament, nearly all of which defy such an understanding. Indeed, I find it darkly amusing that you claim your view makes things clearer, when, in fact, unless we understand Christ as a Person separate from his Father, we can make no sense of the most simplest statements in the New Testament. Take (1) Jesus’ statement that he came not on his own, but that He (the Father) who sent him is true. In what sense is there one singular God here? For that would mean that Christ sent
himself if there is one God, despite his having said he came
not on his own. Or (2) what of Christ’s statement when he asked the Father to glorify him in order that the
Father would be glorified? In what sense is there one God here? For that would mean Christ aimed to glorify
himself to the extent that there is one God. Or again, (3) in what sense did Christ mean that the Spirit, when he came, would
not speak of himself? For if there is but one God then in some sense the Spirit
must speak of himself. Do you see the problem? These are plain-sounding statements by Jesus, yet according to the guidelines you give us they really cannot be understood with any clarity at all.
This is why I have come to question the traditional understanding of the Trinity. For there is great danger, I believe, in making exceptions to the meaning of words simply because God is the grammatical subject. Again, Calvinists do this all the time, with the word “foreknowledge,” for example. Yet as Prof. Thomas Edgar points out, if words can change their meanings depending on whether God is the grammatical subject, how can we be sure what any word means when God is the subject? Take
Elohim for example. The claim is made that Babylonian and Canaanite cultures sometimes referred to their respective chief deities under the name Elohim. But what is the percentage of such occurrences in extra-biblical writings where this is the case, compared to all the occurrences of Elohim in ancient literature? One percent? Two percent? But then why do we insist on using the minority use of this word to inform biblical translations? Indeed, is it really so unreasonable to suppose another scenario, i.e., that the Babylonians and Canaanites distorted the meaning of the biblical Elohim—understood properly beforetime by Noah and by Noah’s sons—from a plurality of Persons who act in single-mindedness (hence the singular verbs and pronouns), to an application where their respective chief deities could embody, by sound-association, the quality of majesty inherent in the word “Elohim”? Again, it seems to me the old adage is wisest, which says that the Old Testament in revealed in the New, and the New Testament hidden in the Old, and that we ought to take the plainer sounding statements of the New Testament to inform the rather bizarre-sounding ones of the Old, rather than have the Old ‘inform’ the New.
Finally, a word about the Hebrew word
echad and the Greek word
heis in the statement “Hear, O Israel: The Lord thy God is one Lord.” Here the word
God in Deuteronomy 6:4 is the Hebrew word
Elohim, and in Mark 12:29 the Greek word is
theos; and here the word
one in Deuteronomy 6:4 is the Hebrew word
echad, and in Mark 12:29 it is the Greek word
heis. As for the singular “theos”, Thayer lists “Godhead” among the meanings. And we can see why, when taking into account a verse like Matthew 3:9, since, when Jesus says that “God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham,” it is clear that the Son could perform this feat, and not just the Father (or the Father and the Spirit). But perhaps more to the point, your claim that I ought to find the term
one Lord “clear enough” is obviously your way of saying that
echad and
heis cannot mean a corporate one. But, in fact, the Greek word
heis is used to refer to a corporate one in John 17:21-22, where Jesus prays that “they will be
one (Gr.
heis), even as WE are
one (Gr.
heis), and the Hebrew word
echad is likewise used to refer to a corporate one, in the phrase “one flesh” in Genesis 2:24, an idea repeated in kind in Corinthians in the phrase “one body,” which is the state a man finds himself who has joined himself to a whore, and here the word “one” is the Gr.
heis. So, yeah, something is, in fact, clear enough to me now—I realize why, as a traditional Trinitarian, you wouldn’t find it in your best interest to notify readers of the full spectrum of meaning for Gr.
heis.
Yet this is only one method of how traditional Trinitarians have advanced their view. The other effective method has been to use language vaguely while talking about how God is One, while allowing the natural association of thoughts about Christ, who is the image of God, to lead people to suppose the oneness is somehow personal. And so Trinitarian language typically runs thus: “But though there are three Persons of God, yet God is not Three, but One.”Thus the Trinitarian assiduously avoids and even contrasts
personal language to describe the
oneness of God, though it should be evident to us that, since Christ is the most plain manifestation of God Christians can think of, Christians will inevitably think of the oneness of God as personal, anyway. Yet to actually
state that God is Three Persons yet only One Person would be plainly absurd. Indeed, this would invite actual questions about what it means to be a person, an aspect of inquiry also avoided in Trinitarian discussions, since personhood based (properly) on the creation of thought and choice would uphold the plurality, not singularity, of
Elohim.
So, back-tracking a bit, backwoodsman, who does Jesus mean by “we” in John 17:22? And could not Christ have had in view the “we” when he speaks of “one Lord” in Mark 12:29? Should we, as you generally advocate in these matters, make the plain meaning obscure, so that only the obscure remains? Or, rather, should we not understand the obscure in light of the plain?