Spiritual machines?

[_kaufmannphillips]

Hello, Micah,

Thank you for your extensive reply. And I still have one from you in the other thread to respond to!

...despite the fact that evolution would be a statistically phenomenal event ... it would take another statistically phenomenal event to have only one species develop these traits.

Yes. But I must admit that statistical phenomenality only expresses likelihood, not impossibility. Does likelihood impact my own assessment of whether something actually transpired or not? Of course. It impacts my assessment of the claims of the gospel, for example. But I cannot tell an evolutionist that their extraordinarily improbable scenario is utterly impossible.

Quote:
There is practical advantage to males limiting sexual access to their females. For one thing, it can reduce the spread of venereal disease. For another, it makes it easier to identify which offspring belong to whom, which makes for a more tightly-knit familial unit. The familial unit is an advantage because it provides a more stable setting for mutual support and the rearing of children, along with a certain efficiency through assignment of interpersonal responsibility and caregiving. And, of course, humans are far from the only species to have males limit sexual access to their females.

I guess I am a little lost with the point you are trying to make here. What part of his article are you trying to dispute with this paragraph? Or are you trying to say we are not that much different than the animals? If it is the latter, than yes, you are going to find some similarities, but overall humans have distinct traits that none of the other animals have.

The paragraph is meant to contribute to the larger discussion of how human sensitivity to nudity could arise without a spiritual origin. It is intended to argue that there is practical advantage to males limiting sexual access to females, and we can see a similar trait expressed in other species, which presumably would benefit in similar ways from the same advantageous development in behavior.

On your latter point, I think that the more closely one considers the "distinct traits" of humans, the less of these traits one actually finds. I used to work as an aide in a high school biology class, and one of the annual activities was to make a list of uniquely human traits. It became a far more challenging exercise than one might expect.

Why then don’t any other animals exhibit this trait? You don’t see the male Lion covering his female lions in order to dissuade other male lions from his pride.

Three possible reasons: (1) most other species lack the technological sophistication to make practical coverings; (2) many other species are more driven by motivators other than visual stimulus (e.g., odor/pheromones); and (3) many other species lack year-round reproductive drives, so consistent pre-emptive habits like clothing would be less necessary.

Quote:
Eventually, they might also seek to hedge their bonds by developing the practice of males covering their own exciting parts. As this hedge would become more and more common, the natural engines of social conformity would kick in, and psychological issues of embarrassment and shame would enter the picture. Of course, these psychological factors and the engines of social conformity are an advantage, inasmuch as they contribute to greater cohesiveness and cooperation amongst a social group.

Do you have evidence of this? I think you are jumping to a conclusion here without showing this process in any other species.

I am unaware of any evidence available for demonstrating the rise of clothing as a human behavior. The practice originates far enough in the past that it would seem difficult to document or excavate. What I have given is simply a viable proposal to counter Enyart's point that the nudity taboo demonstrates spiritual condition; his point is insufficiently grounded, because there are other plausible explanations for the phenomenon of the taboo.

Beyond this, surely it is not necessary for me to produce evidence for the psychological engines of embarassment and social conformity. It should be apparent that such engines contribute to group congruence, and generally speaking, congruent groups have an advantage over conflicting groups or mere individuals.

I was not attempting to undergird this point through parallel in other species. Not being a science guy, my knowledge of how other species enforce conformity in the face of social deviance is limited. But it is unnecessary to my point to show a parallel in other species. The point is that there is pragmatic/non-spiritual advantage to such behavior, and such advantage is sufficient reason for the behavior's ascendance amongst humans.

Quote:
Beyond this, the concept of sexual privacy allows for a more intimate and circumscribed sexual experience, which contributes to a closer and more distinct psychological bond, and thus a stronger familial unit.

No other animals need privacy. Why do we? Seems like an odd concept to develop when everything around you does the opposite.

Sexual privacy is a relative thing in different cultures and circumstances, of course. It is certainly not a human need, but a (widespread) human preference. I believe my quote explains why there is practical advantage to this psychological preference.

Furthermore, sexual privacy reduces the strain of sexual competition upon the community at large. Due to strong human response to visual stimulation, and due to a year-round reproductive cycle, the constant stress placed by provocative sexual activity could be detrimental to the group's other activities. Many other animals have limited seasons of reproductive activity, during which the season of conflict is somewhat of an asset to the sifting and improvement of the gene pool. But a season of conflict is more sustainable than a constant climate of tension. I am unaware of another species that has competitive mating strategy, group cooperative dynamics, and year-round fertility. But as I said, I'm not a science guy, so there may be others. It would be interesting to see how they address the challenges of the conflicting dynamics.

Again, what other species does [excretory privacy]? If the point of the atheist is that we evolved from a prehistoric animal species than why are we the only one doing this?
...
Do you have any examples of animals that exhibit [the] trait of humor?

I have already linked the excretory taboo to the sexual one. If animals lack a sexual taboo, then the lack of an excretory taboo is not an additional piece of evidence, but only a subset of the previous one.

I am not sufficiently privy to the inner psyches of animals to assess what their sense of humor may or may not be. Neither, I expect, are most other people (Dr. Doolittle excepted, of course ).

It is, of course, unnecessary to find parallels for every human behavior in other species to demonstrate evolution. There is no reason why any species cannot have unique traits. But parallel traits, when identifiable, may lend additional illustration to a trait's relative usefulness and advantage.

The relevant issue for Enyart's argument is whether the distinctive behaviors he identified in humans actually demonstrate spiritual condition. If practical advantages to these behaviors can be identified, then they do not require spiritual sources to have established them in human practice. The practical advantage to modesty taboos has already been discussed. The practical advantage to humor can also be established, as a mechanism for defusing social tension, and for relieving psychological tension due to the discrepancies between conceptual ideals and imperfect reality. How does humor make us feel better about embarrassment or disappointment? Emmet's proposal: one part endorphins, four parts social conditioning. It is worth remembering that children generally must be schooled in the art of humor.

[introduced from Enyart:] "In rejecting God, an individual or societal conscience can be seared and values lowered. So tribesmen can adopt minimalist clothing and condition their women to go topless, but missionaries find that women in such cultures readily reassert their modesty. Behaviors that are characteristically human, which are unlike those in the animal kingdom from which we supposedly evolved just a short time ago, testify to a morality of human nature imposed upon us by the Creator."

Perhaps I should have commented on Enyart's remarks the first time around. There were tribes who were not receptive to the innovations of missionaries, and it begs the question to state that tribeswomen “reassert their modesty” when their historical practices cannot be verified. I have worked with children for many years, and it seems to me that young children exhibit no natural modesty whatsoever. The little nudists are embarrassing only to their more-highly-conditioned elders, and even young school-agers may still be liable to rather immodest ways. When these behaviors are changed, it is because of (usually) explicit or (at least) implicit social insistence upon conformity to conventional norms.

Beyond this, it must be admitted that perceptions of modesty are culturally and situationally defined. Elsewise, how are we to argue that long sleeves and pants are not necessary to preserve modesty? Or veils?

As for the "short time" factor, the many thousands of years ascribed to modern human existence by evolutionary theory provides more than ample time for the emergence of virtually any unique behavioral practice, seeing as humans over the last three thousand years have produced a variety of cultural and behavioral innovations.

I would say beauty is in the eye of the human beholder. People tend to cringe at the sight of things that don’t look normal. Like when someone gets burnt in a fire, but you don’t see that same tendency in a dog. Dogs don’t care what you look like as long as you are there to give them the attention they want.

Dogs are less visual than humans. When it comes to first impressions, they do react negatively to people for their own reasons, perhaps more related to olfactory standards. But in this realm, I fear we must call upon Dr. Doolittle again. Otherwise, I see an excessive claim of knowledge to the inner workings of animal psyches and motivations. How can we determine whether or not a dog entertains concepts of beauty? There is no reason why their doing so would necessarily be recognizable from a human standpoint.

I think he brings up very valid points and you haven’t proved to me that animals have at least displayed a remote likeness to the qualities of those found in humans.

When evaluating Enyart’s “very valid points,” it is appropriate to substantiate that animals do not have “a remote likeness to the qualities of those found in humans.” On many points, I find it next to impossible to prove such a thing either way, because to do so would require intimate knowledge of animal psyches; sadly, we actually lack a Dr. Doolittle. As such, Enyart’s arguments about human distinctiveness from the psychological quarter are insubstantial.

But when exploring the issue of human distinctiveness with such abilities as we do have, we find that the animal kingdom nearly always features some rudimentary parallel (or, evolutionists might say, precursor) to human “distinctives.” Animals may not practice human modesty, but many do have conventional gradations of body language or behavior that can cause greater or lesser tension in their social relationships. This becomes apparent even from episodes of “Wild Kingdom.” Beyond this, it appears that we can condition some creatures – dogs, for example – into developing guilt-attachments to certain behaviors. Dogs may have no modesty issues with pooping in front of humans, but when they poop on the carpet, some dogs exhibit what appear to be feelings of guilt (after sufficient housebreaking, of course). Arguably, we could instill similar inhibitions about pooping in front of humans – if we wanted to. Fact is, we have to instill such inhibitions into little humans.

I think there is a lot of basis for drawing a exclusive distinction between human and animal nature. If the atheist is claiming we evolved from animals than we should exhibit the very same traits as those animals. Or those animals should be exhibiting at least similar traits to us. What we find, however, is that we are a very distinct species that separate us from all other animals. This shouldn’t be the case if we evolved from them.

By this argument, no animal should have an eye, if none of the animals before it had an eye. New developments that result in speciation will, by definition, involve unique distinctions. But as I’ve addressed above, I think that there are more basic similarities than people are liable to notice. I have addressed the issues of music and modesty; the same could be extended to sports or what have you. But at times, it may require more abstract thought than some folks are accustomed to.

However, there should be an explanation for why we are so different from the animals. So far, the Bible has those answers and evolution does not. If the atheists don’t have evolution than what do they have?

If evolution can be understood to account for how a pine tree and a rhinoceros have ended up so different from each other, then I do not see how the gradation of differences between humans and other members of the animal kingdom are inherently insurmountable. For my part, I do not see an utter impossibility to the evolutionary proposal – just astronomical improbability, within the geological time-frame allowable on Earth.

Thank you again for your extensive reply, Micah.

Shalom,
Emmet

[Guest]

I have already linked the excretory taboo to the sexual one. If animals lack a sexual taboo, then the lack of an excretory taboo is not an additional piece of evidence, but only a subset of the previous one.

I am not so sure the latter is a "subset" of the previous one.

Cats do not seem to have any inhibitions with public copulation. Yet, they cover their excrement after defecating. Why do they cover it? Dogs, horses, goats, cattle, and other mammals don't. How does evolutionary theory explain this behaviour in cats? It doesn't seem to contribute to their survival.

[_kaufmannphillips]

Hello, Paidion,

Thank you for your response.

I am not so sure the latter is a "subset" of the previous one.

The reason I have termed it a "subset" is because I have identified the excretory privacy taboo in humans as stemming from the sexual privacy taboo. If animals lack the root taboo, then their lacking the ancillary taboo does not qualify as an additional difference between them and humans; it is all part of the same complex.

One may certainly disagree with my linking the two privacy taboos together. However, given that we segregate our excretion by gender, there might be some manner of sexual dynamic at play in the excretory taboo - at least in our culture.

Cats do not seem to have any inhibitions with public copulation. Yet, they cover their excrement after defecating. Why do they cover it? Dogs, horses, goats, cattle, and other mammals don't. How does evolutionary theory explain this behaviour in cats? It doesn't seem to contribute to their survival.

The apparent benefit would be in the removal of fecal material from the public sphere. This could yield a health benefit. The Hebrew bible requires soldiers to do likewise.

But a survival benefit is not necessary to explain a trait in evolutionary theory. The element of chance would allow for neutral or even mildly harmful traits to remain amongst a genetic population, so long as they did not excessively diminish the overall viability of the population. Evolutionists do not claim that their process is as perfect as God; in fact, many point to the imperfection of lifeforms' structures as an argument in favor of their messy process, versus creation by fiat of a perfectly powerful and intelligent being. Of course, many creationists will attribute structural imperfections to the fall of creation.

Thank you again for your response.

Shalom,
Emmet

[Guest]

Greetings, “atheist”.

Some thoughts. Please forgive the forthcoming randomness since I am unaccustomed to posting and indeed writing my thoughts down. This is only my second post (ever, anywhere); I’m really new to the internet world. Here goes.

It would seem to me that your challenge implies that since the “Spiritual Machines” display feelings, emotions, claim to have needs, etc that these attributes therefore necessitate a proper response from people. i.e. “grant rights” I would challenge the validity of this logical leap on your part as faulty from the start.

Christians would hold that God created this and that and at the end of the creation events he deemed all he had done as, “Good”. Included in this creation was the special creation of humankind which he also declared as “Good” and he may have even declared humankind as “Very Good” i.e. a greater goodness than any other created thing, most valuable (in His estimation) than anything else. To this end the value of humankind is that God has declared mankind to be special, not that man has value because of “feelings, emotions, and maybe even spirituality.” Insert a diatribe about abortion here. Your challenge assumes that the feelings the spiritual machines have; create the value and therefore require a proper response, grant rights. I should point out here that since God has not declared your hypothetical spiritual machines “Good” we would not be justified in a logical leap in the opposite direction, that is to say we could not abuse them with impunity. Very Bad.

Within the creation narrative we have specific instruction to “have dominion over” creation and as such we have been given a task to which we shall be held accountable for. I would draw out from this mandate that mankind is to be a good steward over the creation that God places value on. This works itself out in my life in a proper respect for the resources God has placed in my charge, respect for the environment, time management, other sentient beings, and personal relationships.

Your specific question, “how would you treat such machines?” I would not give them equal rights as to humans since they are not humans, special creation as mentioned above. Yes, “atheist”, you are the center of the spiritual universe. At the point where you interject the notion that the robots claimed to have spiritual needs, difficult to address, much like the can God create a rock to big to move conundrum. That metaphysical part of man that God has breathed into man is the “Very Good” I spoke of earlier. Since this is not happening to the spiritual machines they are not spiritual machines. Again your premise is faulty; and by extension impossible. The evolution of the machines to spirituality could not be a function of anything other than God breathing into man, “Very Good” Since this imparting of the metaphysical “Spiritual” did not happen they are not by definition spiritual. They merely emulate behaviors that spiritual beings, man, exhibit without the “ghost in the machine”.

That’s all I have time for right now, you may want amplification on some point. Let me know and I will try and oblige.

Finally, two Christian philosophers that have addressed similar topics.
Arthur F. Holmes, “All Truth is God’s Truth” published circa 1980, Eerdmans
Francis A. Schaeffer, “God is not Silent”

Dave

[Guest]

Very interesting and thought provoking Dave. Thanks!

[Guest]

I just came across an interesting article that pertains to this discussion at
http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5560

Here it is:

Weighing a Chicken With a Yardstick

Gregory Koukl

Can science disprove the existence of the soul? Here Greg deals with advances in computer science and neurology, and the limitations of science.

I received a letter from a listener last week. Some of you might remember the comment that I made about four or five weeks ago that it's impossible for science to prove that there is no soul. This gentleman was a bit bothered because he felt I was speaking in a vacuum, as it were, and I really didn't know what I was talking about, and making a comment like that not only misleads my listeners into having a false sense of confidence about this issue, but also to those who know better it makes me a little bit foolish.

Let me give you a couple of points that he made and then I'll give you my response because I stand fully behind what I said earlier. He mentions that I made this comment that science would never be able to disprove the existence of the soul or the immaterial mind then he quotes Christian philosopher Mortimer Adler. Many of you have probably heard his name. He's written some fine books. He says that Adler disagrees with me in a particular book that Adler wrote, Intellect: Mind Over Matter. "Adler investigates the body-mind problem from a Christian philosophical perspective. He prefers to call the soul or immaterial mind the intellect. And he agrees with people like J.P. Moreland that the brain is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the mind." In other words, the brain works together with the mind, but it's something different than the mind. It has to be there for the mind to work. Although Moreland doesn't say that entirely, he does say there's a connection. But it is something different from the mind, which would be my view.

The writer goes on to say, "[Adler] goes on a step further and says that if science is ever able to produce a machine that can conceptualize on a conversational level it will prove that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind and therefore do away with the necessity of postulating an immaterial mind." Adler doesn't believe this is possible, but the way to disprove the existence of the mind and therefore undercut the Christian position is to produce a machine that can conceptualize on a conversational level. And if it can do that then it will do what we think it takes a mind to do. That would prove that a mind is not necessary and therefore, by inference, would prove that human minds don't exist and Christianity would be discredited.

The writer notes that "Adler spends some time explaining why conceptualization is the premier attribute of the human mind and why the experiencing of emotion is of no consequence, not the attribute of self-awareness." This is an important point. "The reason I'm writing this is because you made your grand pronouncement that science will never be able to disprove the soul without giving any indication that you are aware of the implications of quantum physics, or of the progress in artificial intelligence and the neurological sciences. Aside from the fact that the onus of proving a proposition is on the person who makes it [presumably me in this case], and certainly the existence of the soul is not proved, it appears contrary to your assertion that this is a metaphysical idea that at least theoretically can be disproved by science. Adler points out that Christians would probably not accept this proof and would go on as if nothing had happened. But he knows that the game would be up and Christianity would never again be what it was."

He concludes his letter, "I hope you will [respond on the air] because this kind of statement in a vacuum, so to speak, convinces knowledgeable listeners that you haven't a clue as to what you're talking about, and of course this contradicts the very premise of your show. Lest you think I'm some kind of rabid physicalist, I am a Zen Buddhist with a grat respect for the Christian religion even though I consider dualism to be a profound error." And it's signed "respectfully."

I would like to take a few moments and hopefully convince you that I'm not speaking in a vacuum and that I do know what I'm talking about. But I also want to give you some tools of thinking to help put down this broad concern. The concern is that because of the progress of neurological sciences and computer technology and the idea of artifical intelligence (I'm going to set the quantum mechanics issue aside for today because it's a separate issue) that we're actually getting close to a machine that can actually think. Once we do that, once we make a machine that can actually think and, in Adler's words "conceptualize on a conversational level," then we will have proven away the existence of the soul. When the soul is gone, Christianity is gone and our position is ultimately refuted. My response is you don't have to be frightened of that for a number of reasons.

First, my view that science is incapable of proving that souls don't exist is hard to escape given the current definition of science. That definition is based on a materialistic view of the world called naturalism. Science deals with physical things governed by physcial laws. According to this definition, when the writer started talking about non-physical things he's talking about theology or philosophy, but he's not talking about science. Modern science deals only with the physical universe of cause and effect, governed by natural laws in a metaphysically closed system. By very definition, science cannot address itself directly to the question of whether non-physical things like souls exist or not. Such a question is outside its capabilities, as science is now currently defined. Some other method is necessary.

It's as if the scientist is attempting to say, "We don't see invisible things; therefore invisible things aren't there." But one can't see invisible things precisely because they're invisible. Of course you wouldn't be able to physically measure a non-physical thing. Science has a tendency of assuming something doesn't exist because it can't measure it. But this approach simply is circular and, therefore, false.

Philosopher Dr. Greg Bahnsen calls this the "Crackers in the Pantry Fallacy." To answer the question "Are there crackers in the pantry?" one need only go look. But not everything is proven in the same way. This is a physicalist response; it tests the existence of physical things. But a soul by definition is not a physical thing, therefore you can't "go look" for it in a physical kind of way.

This was my principle point in the comment quoted. He wrote "Contrary to your assertion, this is a metaphysical idea that, at least theoretically, can be disproved by science." I disagree. Metaphysical arguments can't be disproved by science, even theoretically, precisely because they're meta-physical. They transcend the physical realm.

It's like trying to weigh a chicken with a yardstick. Yardsticks don't give weight; they give length. If you said your chicken weighed 27 inches, you'd be speaking nonsense. It's called a category error. Yardsticks simply weren't made to do that sort of thing. That's my point. Science, strictly speaking, is not even capable of testing for souls, so how can it disprove the existence of souls? It can't.

Now on to Mr. Adler's thoughts, and let me quote the letter writer because the wording is important: "If science is ever able to produce a machine that can conceptualize on a conversational level it will prove that the physical brain is sufficient to explain the mind, and thereby do away with the necessity of postulating an immaterial mind....The experiencing of emotion is of no consequence, nor even the attribute of self-awareness."

First, when a dualist -- one who believes there are two things that make a human being, a body and a soul -- when a dualist speaks of the existence of a soul he means something much more than the ability to "conceptualize on a conversational level," and any attempt to address the mind/body problem in this truncated fashion misses the mark wildly.

If the goal is to somehow prove that the brain and physical nervous system, etc., are fully capable of explaining what we believe the soul does, that the mind is really nothing more nor less than a physical brain, then he's got to go the distance. His alternate model has to explain it all, not just one aspect.

To the contrary, the experiencing of emotion and the attribute of self-awareness is of tremendous consequence because these are both critical attributes of the mental life that require an explanation from the physicalist. These simply cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand, nor can one dismiss other mental attributes. Does this machine hold beliefs about things? Does it have intentions and purposings? Does it freely will to do things? Does it feel pain or fear? Does it experience the taste of a strawberry or feel the frustration of unrequited sexual desire?

If this machine model of mind cannot actually do these things -- not imitate them; a mere imitation won't do -- then it does not do what human minds do. And if it does not account for all of the details of the mental life of a human soul then it does not "do away with the necessity of postulating an immaterial mind." On the contrary, when we look at all of the details and ask the question, "What view best explains the evidence?", the idea of an immaterial mind does a better job of explaining the vast landscape of mental experience than does the machine-as-mind alternative.

Secondly, "if/then" assertions ("If science is ever able to produce a machine that can conceptualize on a conversational level, [then] it will prove that the physical brain is sufficient to explain the mind.") can be true conditionals but still be meaningless in the face of a category fallacy. The conditional statement "If I was a trolley car, then I'd have wheels," is true but useless; you're not a trolley car and you'll never be one, not even theoretically. Adler's statement about machines and minds is much like the statement, "If I can show you an eighth note that's colored blue, then I will have proven that musical notes have color." That's true enough, as far as it goes, but such a statement doesn't change one whit the fact that musical notes are not colored things.

The same category fallacy applies to this issue of the mind. A moment's reflection will demonstrate that mental states simply are not physical things. When we contemplate our own mental life, we are aware of thoughts, beliefs, sensations, yet we're not the least bit tempted to believe they are the sorts of things that have weight, texture, size or extension into space.

My argument is that these are precisely the kinds of things machines can never do by very nature. Machines are material by nature; mental states are immaterial by nature. And no re-ordering of mechanical parts is going to make emotion and ideas and desires and thoughts pop into existence from machinery.

So first, science by its very nature can't disprove a soul's existence because science deals with the physical and is not equipped to measure the meta-physical.

Second, a conversation machine is not enough. One would have to create a machine that could actually do -- not imitate-but actually do -- everything a soul does.

Third, that will never happen because of a fundamental category fallacy: physical things accomplish physical effects, and the mind's functions are not physical, therefore a physical machine will not be able to do what a mind does.

With all of that said, I'm going to give you the farm. I'll concede, for the sake of argument, everything I've refuted up until now -- I'll say that science can deal with this, that a physical machine can actually produce non-physical things like thoughts and intentions, and that it could do every little thing that a human soul could do. What then? What would that prove about human souls? Absolutely nothing.

And this brings me to my final criticism of this reasoning. Even if I granted this fabulous machine, a machine that had every single characteristic of a human being's mental life, if I granted the farm on this one, it would prove absolutely nothing regarding the existence of a human soul.

If a machine was invented that could conceptualize on a conversational level, a machine that could hold beliefs, have intentions and purposings, freely will to do things, feel pain and fear, experience the taste of a strawberry and feel sexual frustration, the only thing it would prove is that a machine could understand, feel, think, desire, and get horney. It proves something about machines; it proves nothing what-so-ever about humans.

It may prove that it's possible for a machine to feel through its machinery what a human being already feels through his soul. But it would not prove that a human being is a mere machine. It would not prove that a human soul doesn't exist.

Actually, it might prove another thing (and this I got from a Star Trek episode, though philosopher Richard Swinburne argues this way, too). If a machine can be made to do all the things a human can, it may prove not that men don't have souls, but that machines do have souls. Once again, it would not prove that human souls don't exist. In fact, it wouldn't even speak to the issue.

This is a serious flaw and I'm a bit stunned that someone of Adler's stature has made this mistake. To "prove that the physical brain is sufficient to explain the mind and thereby do away with the necessity of postulating an immaterial mind," does not lead inexorably to "human minds don't exist."

This is simply a non-sequitur. The second does not follow from the first. To suggest that the shaking house (to use a timely illustration) could have been explained by a large truck driving by does not prove that the truck shook the house, not an earthquake. The suggestion merely identifies the range of possible explanations. Even if a thing is a possible explanation, it doesn't follow that it's a necessary explanation or even the best explanation. That's an entirely different question. An alternate explanation, even a viable one, simply is not a refutation of the first position. And that's Adler's mistake.

As you can see, my prior statement was not made in a vacuum, as was suggested.

This is a transcript of a commentary from the radio show "Stand to Reason," with Gregory Koukl. It is made available to you at no charge through the faithful giving of those who support Stand to Reason. Reproduction permitted for non-commercial use only. ©1996 Gregory Koukl

For more information, contact Stand to Reason at 1438 East 33rd St., Signal Hill, CA 90755
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[Guest]

Hello Emmet,

Thank you for your extensive reply. And I still have one from you in the other thread to respond to!

Well, yours are just as extensive and thanks for replying.

Yes. But I must admit that statistical phenomenality only expresses likelihood, not impossibility. Does likelihood impact my own assessment of whether something actually transpired or not? Of course. It impacts my assessment of the claims of the gospel, for example. But I cannot tell an evolutionist that their extraordinarily improbable scenario is utterly impossible.

I agree that it is highly improbable. To me, I find that it takes more faith to believe that, than it does to believe in a supreme being who created everything.

Three possible reasons:
(1) most other species lack the technological sophistication to make practical coverings;

However, those species that do have the ability to make practical coverings don’t do so. You don’t see the ape practicing the same level of modesty as us.

(2) many other species are more driven by motivators other than visual stimulus (e.g., odor/pheromones); and

Whether they are or not, it still doesn’t explain why we are the only species to have developed these certain traits.

(3) many other species lack year-round reproductive drives, so consistent pre-emptive habits like clothing would be less necessary.

But those species that are similar to us in that respect do not show the same kind of embarrassment or need to clothe their females.

I am unaware of any evidence available for demonstrating the rise of clothing as a human behavior. The practice originates far enough in the past that it would seem difficult to document or excavate. What I have given is simply a viable proposal to counter Enyart's point that the nudity taboo demonstrates spiritual condition; his point is insufficiently grounded, because there are other plausible explanations for the phenomenon of the taboo.

But the plausible explanations so far, don’t have plausible evidence to support it.

Beyond this, surely it is not necessary for me to produce evidence for the psychological engines of embarassment and social conformity. It should be apparent that such engines contribute to group congruence, and generally speaking, congruent groups have an advantage over conflicting groups or mere individuals.

I was not attempting to undergird this point through parallel in other species. Not being a science guy, my knowledge of how other species enforce conformity in the face of social deviance is limited. But it is unnecessary to my point to show a parallel in other species. The point is that there is pragmatic/non-spiritual advantage to such behavior, and such advantage is sufficient reason for the behavior's ascendance amongst humans.

However, my point would be that if you (you being the evolutionist viewpoint) are going to claim that we evolved from animals than you should see a closer similarity in behaviors between humans and the other species. Instead we exhibit traits that no other animals do. So, if evolution is true than where did these traits come from? A lot of the traits that we have offer us no survival advantage, so it seems impractical that we even developed them.

I am not sufficiently privy to the inner psyches of animals to assess what their sense of humor may or may not be. Neither, I expect, are most other people (Dr. Doolittle excepted, of course ).

It is, of course, unnecessary to find parallels for every human behavior in other species to demonstrate evolution. There is no reason why any species cannot have unique traits. But parallel traits, when identifiable, may lend additional illustration to a trait's relative usefulness and advantage.

The relevant issue for Enyart's argument is whether the distinctive behaviors he identified in humans actually demonstrate spiritual condition. If practical advantages to these behaviors can be identified, then they do not require spiritual sources to have established them in human practice. The practical advantage to modesty taboos has already been discussed. The practical advantage to humor can also be established, as a mechanism for defusing social tension, and for relieving psychological tension due to the discrepancies between conceptual ideals and imperfect reality. How does humor make us feel better about embarrassment or disappointment? Emmet's proposal: one part endorphins, four parts social conditioning. It is worth remembering that children generally must be schooled in the art of humor.

Again, it is necessary to show a parallel, when one is making the argument that we evolved from animals. If all animals are exhibiting the same behavioral traits (ie. Not embarrassed about excrement or sexual behavior), than humans should be showing the same trait. Now each animal may have unique traits like the dog wanting to please its master more than the cat does, but when all animals express the same kind of traits than humans should have them as well.

Perhaps I should have commented on Enyart's remarks the first time around. There were tribes who were not receptive to the innovations of missionaries, and it begs the question to state that tribeswomen “reassert their modesty” when their historical practices cannot be verified. I have worked with children for many years, and it seems to me that young children exhibit no natural modesty whatsoever. The little nudists are embarrassing only to their more-highly-conditioned elders, and even young school-agers may still be liable to rather immodest ways. When these behaviors are changed, it is because of (usually) explicit or (at least) implicit social insistence upon conformity to conventional norms.

It still doesn’t answer the question where modesty came from?

Beyond this, it must be admitted that perceptions of modesty are culturally and situationally defined. Elsewise, how are we to argue that long sleeves and pants are not necessary to preserve modesty? Or veils?

Yes, they are, but it still doesn’t give evidence to where it started from.

As for the "short time" factor, the many thousands of years ascribed to modern human existence by evolutionary theory provides more than ample time for the emergence of virtually any unique behavioral practice, seeing as humans over the last three thousand years have produced a variety of cultural and behavioral innovations.

It may give ample time, but it still doesn’t explain why we are the only ones to exhibit such traits when all of the other animals exhibit the opposite trait.

Dogs are less visual than humans. When it comes to first impressions, they do react negatively to people for their own reasons, perhaps more related to olfactory standards. But in this realm, I fear we must call upon Dr. Doolittle again. Otherwise, I see an excessive claim of knowledge to the inner workings of animal psyches and motivations. How can we determine whether or not a dog entertains concepts of beauty? There is no reason why their doing so would necessarily be recognizable from a human standpoint.

If we cannot recognize thought through behavior than how can we determine anything that an animal is thinking? For example, when a dog growls we know it is angry, the same for a human that scowls at someone. If a dog wags its tail we know it is happy to see you, the same when a human smiles. When a human’s eyes get big or the mouth drops in amazement at a sunset we know they are impressed with the beauty of the view. A dog on the other hand shows no expression whatsoever. The same goes with something viewed as ghastly. A human shows shock and an appalling expression, where as the dog gives no expression at all.
All animals are this way, but humans are not. If humans evolved from animals than this shouldn’t be the case.

When evaluating Enyart’s “very valid points,” it is appropriate to substantiate that animals do not have “a remote likeness to the qualities of those found in humans.” On many points, I find it next to impossible to prove such a thing either way, because to do so would require intimate knowledge of animal psyches; sadly, we actually lack a Dr. Doolittle. As such, Enyart’s arguments about human distinctiveness from the psychological quarter are insubstantial.

Again, if we can’t know what a dog psyche is saying through their behavior than we can never relate at all.

But when exploring the issue of human distinctiveness with such abilities as we do have, we find that the animal kingdom nearly always features some rudimentary parallel (or, evolutionists might say, precursor) to human “distinctives.” Animals may not practice human modesty, but many do have conventional gradations of body language or behavior that can cause greater or lesser tension in their social relationships. This becomes apparent even from episodes of “Wild Kingdom.” Beyond this, it appears that we can condition some creatures – dogs, for example – into developing guilt-attachments to certain behaviors. Dogs may have no modesty issues with pooping in front of humans, but when they poop on the carpet, some dogs exhibit what appear to be feelings of guilt (after sufficient housebreaking, of course). Arguably, we could instill similar inhibitions about pooping in front of humans – if we wanted to. Fact is, we have to instill such inhibitions into little humans.

However, we can only instill into the dog that pooping is bad in a certain area. I can’t instill into the dog that it should be embarrassed about pooping in public.

By this argument, no animal should have an eye, if none of the animals before it had an eye. New developments that result in speciation will, by definition, involve unique distinctions. But as I’ve addressed above, I think that there are more basic similarities than people are liable to notice. I have addressed the issues of music and modesty; the same could be extended to sports or what have you. But at times, it may require more abstract thought than some folks are accustomed to.

But if all the animals have eyes and we didn’t than that would seem awfully strange, wouldn’t it?

If evolution can be understood to account for how a pine tree and a rhinoceros have ended up so different from each other, then I do not see how the gradation of differences between humans and other members of the animal kingdom are inherently insurmountable. For my part, I do not see an utter impossibility to the evolutionary proposal – just astronomical improbability, within the geological time-frame allowable on Earth.

The problem is evolution can’t explain the account for how a pine tree and a rhinoceros have ended up so different from each other. They are only hypothetical guesses based on no evidence at all. In my opinion it takes an astronomical amount of faith to believe in evolution and less faith to believe in a supernatural creator.

Thanks for your responses.

Take care,
Micah

[Guest]

There was a medical doctor in this area who used to weigh his seriously ill patients both before and after their deaths. This doctor claimed that they all weighed less after death than before. His conclusion? Their souls had departed from their bodies.

[_kaufmannphillips]

Hello, Micah,

Thank you for your latest response!

However, those species that do have the ability to make practical coverings don’t do so. You don’t see the ape practicing the same level of modesty as us.

Generally speaking, apes live in locations where the physical environment eliminates any practical need for covering. One might expect that clothing was invented first for practical reasons, and that modesty was a later social/psychological development made possible by the technological innovation. And humans in parallel environment have often enough dwelt au naturel, like the apes.

Beyond this, some apes have formed different sexual ettiquette than humans, so the entire modesty matrix would be less practically relevant for some of them. The bonobos, for example, go rather beyond disregard for modesty, into outright bisexual promiscuity as a means of social relation and de-escalation of tension.

But the significance of my observation is that the small number of animals with similar ability radically decreases the opportunity for there to be similar behavior. And, lack of practical opportunity precludes meaningful comparison on other grounds. So what if dogs never invented trousers? Their inability to make trousers would seem a more obvious reason for the state of things than an unverifiable appeal to spiritual consciousness.

Quote:
(2) many other species are more driven by motivators other than visual stimulus (e.g., odor/pheromones); and

Whether they are or not, it still doesn’t explain why we are the only species to have developed these certain traits.

Like the previous point, this one reduces the number of species that qualify for meaningful comparison. A non-visually-driven species will have little reason to develop traits to counter a visually-driven condition.

Quote:
(3) many other species lack year-round reproductive drives, so consistent pre-emptive habits like clothing would be less necessary.

But those species that are similar to us in that respect do not show the same kind of embarrassment or need to clothe their females.

I am unaware of any other species that has year-round fertility, competitive mating strategy, group cooperative dynamics, and the technical capacity to fashion practical coverings. When we have duplicated all of these factors, then we will have gone a significant way toward finding a parallel subject for comparison amongst the other animals. But without these similar factors, one would not necessarily expect a similar outcome. And, indeed, even with similar factors amongst humans, one does not see a universal outcome.

But the plausible explanations so far, don’t have plausible evidence to support it.

I believe that my comments indicated a lack of evidence available to prove any point concerning the rise of clothing. This is not my problem, because I am not attempting to prove an evolutionary hypothesis. I am attempting to show that Enyart's arguments are insubstantial. Enyart lacks evidence to support his assertion, inasmuch as there is none available to demonstrate the rise of clothing as a human behavior. What Enyart has is bald assertion, and this can be satisfactorily deferred by a differing, plausible explanation.

However, my point would be that if you (you being the evolutionist viewpoint) are going to claim that we evolved from animals than you should see a closer similarity in behaviors between humans and the other species. Instead we exhibit traits that no other animals do. So, if evolution is true than where did these traits come from? A lot of the traits that we have offer us no survival advantage, so it seems impractical that we even developed them. ... Again, it is necessary to show a parallel, when one is making the argument that we evolved from animals. If all animals are exhibiting the same behavioral traits (ie. Not embarrassed about excrement or sexual behavior), than humans should be showing the same trait.

Specifically, what I have claimed is that Enyart's points are insubstantial, and that evolution cannot be excluded to the realm of utter impossibility.

You appear to be strongly impressed by human "distinctives." As I have mentioned previously, there are few (if any) human activities that can be demonstrated as utterly distinctive. We in fact do see many similarities between human activities and animal activities, and (generally speaking) the more so the closer we come to ourselves genetically.

Such distinctives as may/do exist do not challenge an evolutionary theory, since such theory postulates random diversity in features. As such, it is utterly unnecessary for any given feature to be present in any other species. Furthermore, any given feature does not have to be explained in terms of offering an advantage; because change is often a function of random diversity, some features may be neutral and remain in play beause they do not jeopardize a species' viability, and some features may even be detrimental, yet remain in play because they do not jeopardize a species' viability seriously enough. Evolutionary theory postulates a messy and inefficient process of development.

But Enyart's points revolve around distinctives demonstrating spiritual condition, and this is patently unsustainable. We have no way of demonstrating the metaphysical condition of other species in contradistinction to our own.

It still doesn’t answer the question where modesty came from?

I have addressed the origins of sexual privacy and modesty previously. Once again, we are dealing with matters that cannot be demonstrated due to lack of evidence. And once again, this is not my problem. I am not attempting to prove an alternate hypothesis; I am attempting to show that Enyart's arguments do not demonstrate what he purports to be demonstrating.

Overall, you neglect responding to the fact that distinctive behaviors of humans are apparently not innate, but rather inculcated by society. Feral humans (i.e., children who have quite literally been raised by wolves, etc.) do not demonstrate modesty, but rather demonstrate the behavior of their peer group (i.e., wolves). So modesty is not indicative of some innate human spiritual awareness, but rather is a learned behavior that takes different forms in different settings. Other species exhibit the same pattern, where young learn the "etiquette" of expression amongst their peers and come to conform to the group paradigm. This is a relevant counterpoint to Enyart's argumentation.

Beyond this, even in the Eden narrative, Adam and Eve were spiritual beings before they recognized some significance to their being naked, were they not? So we can see that even from a biblical standpoint, spiritual being is not concomitant with a sensitivity to modesty. An animal's lack fo concern for human modesty does not demonstrate their lack of spiritual being. On the other hand, if an animal were sensitive to covering certain portions of their anatomy, we could not demonstrate that such behavior was an expression of spiritual modesty per se, either.

If we cannot recognize thought through behavior than how can we determine anything that an animal is thinking? For example, when a dog growls we know it is angry, the same for a human that scowls at someone. If a dog wags its tail we know it is happy to see you, the same when a human smiles. When a human’s eyes get big or the mouth drops in amazement at a sunset we know they are impressed with the beauty of the view. A dog on the other hand shows no expression whatsoever. The same goes with something viewed as ghastly. A human shows shock and an appalling expression, where as the dog gives no expression at all.
All animals are this way, but humans are not. ... Again, if we can’t know what a dog psyche is saying through their behavior than we can never relate at all.

What we conjecture about animal thought comes largely through projection. Through enough experience, animal handlers can develop a practical gauge of animal behavior, but of course such a gauge is imperfect, and at any rate does not give us an appreciation of the inner consciousness of the animal. If a dog does not appear impressed by a sunset or a corpse, this does not demonstrate that the dog has no sense of beauty - only that the dog does not react to those stimuli in the same way many humans would. But of course there are humans who have no aversion to corpses and who are unimpressed by sunsets; young humans, in particular, often have to be sensitized (or even schooled) in standards and appreciation of beauty. Yet even still, beauty remains in the eye of the beholder. And for dogs, perhaps beauty is in the nose of the beholder. Being less visual, it is possible that those times they spend sniffing around are moments of enjoying canine sensibilities of beauty.

On your last point, not knowing the inner workings of a psyche does not preclude practical relationship. It merely limits relationship. But it would be a mistake to think that behavior is an exhaustive indicator of inner life. Human language and behavior can be casual, incidental, imprecise, guarded, and even duplicitous - all of which can complicate the assessment of inner psychological condition. And yet we regularly relate to people who exhibit all of these qualities, in practical ways, yet without knowing their hearts or minds in an intimate fashion.

However, we can only instill into the dog that pooping is bad in a certain area. I can’t instill into the dog that it should be embarrassed about pooping in public.

I really do not think that it would be difficult to train a dog to poop only when there was no human audience. Should be easy enough.

The problem is evolution can’t explain the account for how a pine tree and a rhinoceros have ended up so different from each other. They are only hypothetical guesses based on no evidence at all.

Evolution can and does explain the difference. But it is hypothetical and incapable of absolute proof, granted. Evidence is of course available, though its interpretation is not limited to one set of possibilities.

And as I have said, it is not my concern to prove evolution. It is my concern to show that Enyart's points are insubstantial. Why should I expend time on such an activity? Because poor arguments for things you believe in are worse than poor arguments for things you don't believe in.

Thanks for your time.

Shalom,
Emmet


P.S.: late editorial note here... In fairness, I should redress my closing statement that "poor arguments for things you believe in are worse than poor arguments for things you don't believe in." This might be a fair comment for me to make when it comes to atheistic evolution as a comprehensive explanation for life on Earth. But I have little problem with evolution taking place to a noticeable extent, either together with or apart from God's direct creative activity. And when it comes to our original subject - spiritual machines, etc. - my perspective does not befit that comment. I do not believe that man has a metaphysical component, so I am fundamentally at odds with Enyart on that point. In his case, I am taking issue with poor arguments for things I don't believe in.

[_kaufmannphillips]

Hello, Paidion,

There was a medical doctor in this area who used to weigh his seriously ill patients both before and after their deaths. This doctor claimed that they all weighed less after death than before. His conclusion? Their souls had departed from their bodies.

If you will pardon my farming this out:

http://www.snopes.com/religion/soulweight.asp

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/ ... 38871.html

Shalom,
Emmet

P.S.: edited one time to insert the quote...