SUNDAY NIGHTS—NEW RADIO PROGRAM on internet

[Suzana]

Sorry if this has already been posted, but...

Can the shows be downloaded anywhere?

The 2010 podcasts are found here:

http://rtfo.theeggbeater.net/

[steve]

I believe all of the shows are also posted right here at http://www.theos.org/media (scroll down to the bottom).

[kaufmannphillips]

kaufmannphillips wrote: I also want to point out that there is not simply one kind of reasoning – of seriously applying one’s mental faculties to data and generating an understanding. Not even all Westerners reason in the same way. And so, we should be cautious when we imagine other persons to be irrational or unreasonable. Their thought may seem irrational or unreasonable to us, because it does not fit our own inclinations in rationality or reason. But we should not imagine our own rationality or reason to define rationality or reason as a whole.

Erik wrote:
What kind of reasoning are you using here? What kind of reasoning would you use, to support the rationality of "other kinds of reasoning" that folks using Steve's kind of reasoning would find irrational?

Not trying to be too clever, what I'm asking is, how do you suppose that you can possibly know that many kinds of reasoning are, in fact, rational? You must be using some higher, overarching system to judge them all. In that case, let's just dispense with all the other sub-kinds of reasoning and simply use the higher one to which all the sub-kinds must pay homage.

You and I may be working from different concepts of “reasoning.” I articulated a rather broad approach: “seriously applying one’s mental faculties to data and generating an understanding.”

On your second question, let me reply with a general illustration. Let us imagine that ten persons are handed a pencil, and a sheet of paper with several dots upon it. These dots are labeled with certain letters of the alphabet.

The first person draws lines connecting the dots in a sequence of alphabetical order.
The second person connects the dots in a sequence of numeric order (like Roman or Hebrew notation).
The third person connects the dots in a sequence derived from arranging the letters into a coherent phrase.
The fourth person connects the dots in a sequence based upon the relative size of the dots.
The fifth person connects the dots in a sequence based upon the relative shade of the dots.
The sixth person connects the dots without regard for sequence, focusing instead on what their relative position to each other suggests about a coherent unified form.
The seventh person designs an elegant spiral that manages to intersect each of the dots.
The eighth person omits the dots marked with vowels and connects the remainder in a sequence of alphabetical order, yielding a symmetrical pattern.
The ninth person postulates additional dots and connects all of the dots into a symmetrical pattern.
The tenth person makes no attempt to connect the dots, and uses them with their letters to head up bulleted items for a grocery list.

Some of these persons might look at one of the other papers, and wonder how on earth somebody could come up with such a thing! At this point, they could attempt to discover the reasoning behind the product; but then again, they could dismiss the other product as foolery.

I am not claiming that all forms of reasoning are equally reliable. But it is important to recognize the distinction between a different sort of reasoning and something that truly is irrational – say, “I think such-and-such is wrong because I get a queasy feeling in my gut when I see it.”

And yet – recognizing this distinction should not coincide with undue contempt for the irrational. The irrational may also have value.

kaufmannphillips wrote:
But there is no guarantee that the universe conforms to human rationality. Human rationality is a finite tool, employed by finite beings. Just as we cannot perceive everything in the universe accurately with our five senses – q. v., e.g., optical illusions - neither should we imagine that our limited rationality can necessarily field every aspect of truth.

Does this mean that we despair of rational activity as humans? No – not any more than we despair of looking at things because sometimes our visual capacities will yield inaccurate perceptions. But we should acknowledge our potential limitation, and be sensitive to the tentativity of any product of human reason.

Erik wrote:
Please examine and re-read these statements. To me, you are standing on the ladder you are trying to knock down.

Standing upon a ladder doesn’t mean that I can’t shake it, so that I and others might see its potential for instability. And better that the ladder should give way while I am wary of its precariousness, than for it to do so while I blithely trust its support.

Erik wrote:
You state some inarguable epistemological truths: we cannot perceive everything 100% accurately, and we cannot field every aspect of truth. Then, you mention not needing to despair of rationality. So far, so good—I couldn't agree more.

But the jump from acknowledging our potential human limitations to the "tentativity" of any product of human reason is, in my mind, totally unsupportable. You're pulling a fast one between one statement and the next, swapping out epistemological statements and swapping in ontological denial.

I do not deny ontology. I deny certainty that human rationality corresponds to ontology.

Now, this stance will in extremis yield a denial of the certainty of ontology. Such is a theoretical bibelot – interesting, but rarely dwelt upon amidst one’s practical activity. The far more common yield of the stance is to allow for the possibility that even after one’s rational analysis has been scrutinized and tested repeatedly, and found to be unimpeachable, one may yet be in error.

Erik wrote:
Even using the analogy of optical illusion, which would seem to favor your viewpoint, after some analysis we can see that it really supports something quite different:

• Perception is not fully reliable. At times, one can think one thing is true, when in fact that belief is totally false.

• However, perception is not arbitrary or baseless. Optical illusions are actually an exposition of the brain's neurology and specific characteristics of its visual processing regions. Optical illusions then, not only teach us about the inner working of our brain, we then use that information (through yet more reason and rationality) to correct our spurious perception, or at least set up safeguards so that when we are in the arena where optical illusions operate, we become more careful and use more checks to ensure that we are really learning what's true, in spite of our distorted perception.

The limitations of optical perception cannot be resolved fully by optical perception itself. And there is no guarantee that limitations in human rationality can be resolved fully by human rationality itself.

In your remarks here, the limitations of optical perception are compensated for by employing other tools besides optical perception alone. So in order to compensate for limitations in the finite tool of human rationality, we might employ other, irrational tools.

But there is no guarantee that these other tools will not have their own limitations, and there is no guarantee that the aggregate of human tools will be adequate to fully compensate for each others’ limitations.

Erik wrote:
Most importantly, in no case do we deny that truth exists. Nor do we suppose that we can't learn what truth is. We work through the tricky issues of our epistemology, and then have confidence in the ontological reality of the things we're looking at.

On what basis do we abstain from supposing that we might not be able to learn what truth is? And on what basis do we suppose that we will successfully work through the challenges in our epistemology?

Erik wrote:
And look at this also: you are using reason to try to convince us that reason is not reliable. If we believe you, why should we suppose, then, that your understanding of the unreliable nature of reason is reliable? You present your argument with an uncritically accepted presupposition (or at least you are implicitly assuming that we agree) that the reason you're using in that argument ought to persuade us of something that is really true. And what you're telling us is really true, is that we can't ever know for sure that anything is really true.

Let me open with some horseplay: What is the “really true” answer to this “yes-or-no” question: “Is the answer to this question ‘no’?”

What I’m telling you is that “we should acknowledge our potential limitation, and be sensitive to the tentativity of any product of human reason.” This is a methodological stance.

May the methodology be applied in turn to itself, and to its premises? Of course.

If you find the methodology to be a finite tool, then you need not despair of it. Derive such utility from the tool as it may afford.

Erik wrote:
Are you a materialist, believing there is no supernature of any kind? Do you believe that humans and their brains arose from entirely naturalistic processes through nothing more than chance and (eventual) natural selection?

Whether everything is material or not, I do not know.

I do not taxonomize according to “nature” and “supernature.”

I do not have a belief about the ultimate origin(s) of humans in general and/or their brains in particular.

Erik wrote:
Do you believe in ontological existence? In other words, if no living being was around to perceive the Earth, would it still exist, would it still be true that it existed, would 2 + 2 = 4 still be true, and it still be false that 2 + 2 = 5? Do you believe in fully relative truth, or do you allow for any kind of absolute truth (has there ever been even one single tiny something unassailably true, and if so, would you give an example)?

I usually think in terms that assume ontological existence.

The Earth may or may not ontologically exist. 2 +2 may or may not equal 4. 2+2 may or may not = 5.

I conceptualize truth along a spectrum, with the theoretical extremities being absolute truth and absolute falsehood. I also afford the possible irrelevance of this conceptualized spectrum.

Erik wrote:
If all perception is suspect, and for this reason all knowledge must be tentative, do you fully accept the possibility that you could be totally, absolutely, completely wrong about everything you have ever said, especially in this forum and this thread?

I fully accept that possibility.

Erik wrote:
Do you see that accepting that you could be wrong about something is evidence that you believe in ontological and absolute truth, since being wrong means that your belief does not correspond to reality, therefore reality is something fixed, something ordered, something structured and coherent enough for other things to be compared to and then either match or not match?

Accepting that I could be wrong correlates with accepting the possibility of ontological and absolute truth. But it does not require belief.

I can accept the possibility that there is a Sasquatch living in Montana, without believing in Sasquatch. Or Montana.

[brody196]

I usually think in terms that assume ontological existence.

The Earth may or may not ontologically exist. 2 +2 may or may not equal 4. 2+2 may or may not = 5.

I conceptualize truth along a spectrum, with the theoretical extremities being absolute truth and absolute falsehood. I also afford the possible irrelevance of this conceptualized spectrum.

So in other words, you know everything and nothing at the same time?

I don't buy it for one minute bro. You use logic and absolutes in your everyday life. I guarantee that if you went to the local Walmart and handed the cashier a 100 dollar bill to pay for a stick of gum, and in return she handed you a nickel back, that would not sit well with you.

And by the way, you used logic to deny the possibility of logic! By answering questions with statements like "may or may not", you are assuming some sort of platform to reason from. Even if that platform is relative, it is still there.

[kaufmannphillips]

kaufmannphillips wrote:
I usually think in terms that assume ontological existence.

The Earth may or may not ontologically exist. 2 +2 may or may not equal 4. 2+2 may or may not = 5.

I conceptualize truth along a spectrum, with the theoretical extremities being absolute truth and absolute falsehood. I also afford the possible irrelevance of this conceptualized spectrum.

brody196wrote:
So in other words, you know everything and nothing at the same time?

I supplied words, and you supplied "other words."

I used the words "think" and "conceptualize." You used the word "know."

brody196 wrote:
I don't buy it for one minute bro. You use logic and absolutes in your everyday life. I guarantee that if you went to the local Walmart and handed the cashier a 100 dollar bill to pay for a stick of gum, and in return she handed you a nickel back, that would not sit well with you.

I very rarely have a 100 dollar bill, and Wal-mart very rarely carries a gum that meets my practice of kashrut. So your “guarantee” exposes you to little risk.

But seriously – I use reason and usually think in terms that assume ontological existence, yes. I also afford the possibility that I could be off-kilter in doing so.

The situation is analogous, for example, to the activity of your driving a car. You may recognize the possibility that at any time your brakes may have ceased to function, unbeknownst to you. But generally you do not drive as if your brakes have failed. Acknowledging a possibility does not mean that one must allow it to dominate their life.

brody196 wrote:
And by the way, you used logic to deny the possibility of logic! By answering questions with statements like "may or may not", you are assuming some sort of platform to reason from. Even if that platform is relative, it is still there.

I do not deny the possibility of logic. I afford the possibility that logic is off-kilter.

There is nothing in that stance that precludes me from using reason, so long as I admit that I may be off-kilter when doing so.

But as for the topic of diction – it would be very cumbersome for me to nuance every statement I make to reflect the full range of possibility that I can imagine. So I face a practical choice: I can make cumbersome statements that are too awkward for most persons to bother considering; or I can curtail my imagination to the boundaries of what is easily articulated; or I can make statements of limited utility, that fail to reflect my full thought, but serve a limited purpose in communication.

I am unwilling to settle for the second option, and though some might say I fail to avoid the first option at times , I am willing to settle for the third option.

[brody196]

I do not deny the possibility of logic. I afford the possibility that logic is off-kilter.

But you just used logic to afford that possibility. Bottom line is: You have to assume that there is a universal standard by which to judge truth. If everything has the possibility of being wrong or different, you still have to apply the universal laws of logic and reason to deduce what is wrong or different.

[brody196]

Hi Kaufmann,

Is Child rape and murder wrong 100% of the time in your worldview? Can you think of any scenarios where it would be neutral or morally acceptable to do such things?

Thanks.

[brody196]

Bump

[darinhouston]

I'll bite...

Child rape - I can't imagine such a scenario.

Murder -- I think you have to define your terms a bit more. Killing another without direct threat to your own or another's life? Maybe. The term itself sort of implies that there are "justifications" that might exist for killing another that would not give rise to a "murderous killing." If I knew that the victim was a Christian and understood the situation, and the killing of him would certainly prevent the killing of others, then I might condone it begrudgingly annd with much conflict. The problem is -- how could you know for sure? God intervened, but Abraham was willing to kill Isaac with only God's will providing the justification, wasn't he ? Could I be so certain of God's will? I doubt it, but one of our bases for assessing God's will is whether it contradicts Scripture. Surely, Abraham knew it was against God's general will to kill an innocent human being.

[brody196]

I'll bite...

Child rape - I can't imagine such a scenario.

Murder -- I think you have to define your terms a bit more. Killing another without direct threat to your own or another's life? Maybe. The term itself sort of implies that there are "justifications" that might exist for killing another that would not give rise to a "murderous killing." If I knew that the victim was a Christian and understood the situation, and the killing of him would certainly prevent the killing of others, then I might condone it begrudgingly annd with much conflict. The problem is -- how could you know for sure? God intervened, but Abraham was willing to kill Isaac with only God's will providing the justification, wasn't he ? Could I be so certain of God's will? I doubt it, but one of our bases for assessing God's will is whether it contradicts Scripture. Surely, Abraham knew it was against God's general will to kill an innocent human being.

My point was to prove that there are absolutes in this universe that God has established. Every human being operates under these absolutes.