Paidion wrote:
As for Arminianism, I have only one major problem with it, and that is the belief that God "looks into the future" and thus knows all the future choices of man. If I choose to help a neighbour today, and that choice was known yesterday, then that choice was settled (fixed) so that I could not have chosen otherwise. For to know that some proposition P is true, implies that P is, in fact, true. So if yesterday, it was known that I help my neighbour today, how could I have done otherwise? Where is my free will, which Arminianism affirms?
This is the great philosophical conundrum that challenges the credibility of Arminianism. I say "challenges," but I don't say "defeats." I agree that "to know that some proposition P is true, implies that P is, in fact, true." It is true, but is it predetermined—and if so, by whom? Let me play with this idea a bit...
Let us say that I will wake up at 7:00 tomorrow morning. I may or may not know this in advance. Perhaps I have determined it, by setting an alarm. Or perhaps I will awaken at 7:00 despite the fact that I set my alarm for 6:00 and overslept. It doesn't matter whether the fact was consciously determined or not. The fact is (in terms of this illustration) that I will awaken at 7:00 AM. If we were to suggest the possibility that God knows tonight that I will awaken at 7:00 tomorrow, will His knowing this fact require that He must be the one who determined it? Perhaps this would be the only way that He would know such a thing with certainty, but what if He had some other way of knowing, which has not been revealed or explained to us, by which He has access to knowledge, but does not make any determination in the matter. He knows what factors will cause me to wake up at that moment, and not at some other, and they might all be factors that I, or someone else, set in motion, apart from divine intervention...
In such a scenario, it would be true (in one sense) that I am "destined" to awaken at 7:00 AM, and that no alternative scenario can be allowed by the facts. However, it would not (in this case) be God who has determined or destined me to awaken at that moment, but it might very well be I who determined it, acting freely and without coercion. If these concepts be allowed, then proposition P—that I will wake up tomorrow at 7:00 AM—is, in fact, true—though nobody but God knows it at this time. The fact that it will happen may be said to destine this outcome—but not to the compromising of my free will, since it may well be that my free will is the very thing that is producing the fact itself, and thus destining that it will be so.
In this illustration, I have left unconsidered the
means by which God might know what will happen. Calvinists might say the means of His knowing was His sovereign decree that it should happen. Open Thieists might argue that God knows the present situation—including my present plans concerning tomorrow, the exact amount of sleep my body will require of me, and/or the trajectory of certain events already in play, but not yet known to me—with sufficient precision that He could accurately calculate the exact time of my awakening. Arminians, like C.S. Lewis and A.W. Tozer, would say that God dwells "outside" time, in the realm of eternity, where all events of the past, present or future are effortlessly
seen, though not necessarily caused by Him. These are three theories. There are also the "middle knowledge" people, like William Lane Craig, whose explanations are over my head. I do not know which view is correct, but all of the above would have God able to foretell, if He wished, the time that I will awaken tomorrow.
Now, the time of my waking tomorrow might truly be determined by God (or other factors beyond my control) so that my "free will" may have nothing to do with the outcome. My will in the matter might even be entirely violated. However, the matter of my waking-up may have little or no ramifications of a moral sort, so it hardly matters, in terms of God's pleasure or displeasure with me, at what time my eyes open tomorrow morning or what factors caused it. What
may indeed matter to God is the way I respond to being awakened. Am I angry at the garbage truck driver whose noise woke me a half-hour earlier than I was planning to arise? Does my sleep-deprivation make me surly and unkind to those who share my morning space? These decisions are my own, and do carry moral significance.
Because they do, I am not inclined to include them among the things that God may determine or ordain. If He determined them outright, then it is He, and not I, who would bear responsibility for my behavior. Yet, I believe that God knows today what my reactions tomorrow will be, just as He knows the time of my awakening. But, in both cases, the fact is not determined by His knowing it, but the reverse. His knowing it is determined by the fact that it will happen a certain way. That I may attribute tomorrow's actions to my own free will, to divine determinism, or to weakness under duress does not change the fact that, when tomorrow morning comes, it will see certain events, and not others. I have no confident theories about how God would have access to this information, but I believe it is not contrary to logic to say that His knowing of it does not add or subtract to the functioning of my will in "real time."