...I think that it is sufficient to say that a foreknowledge which precedes creation, makes the creation of the foreknown thing effectively a decree that it shall be as it was foreknown to be. Which is to say that unless we suppose God to be ignorant of who is or shall be "in Christ" then it is unavoidable that He decreed from the foundation of the world(or at the very least from the creation of the people with whom we are concerned) their salvation or damnation. How does creating one with the foreknowledge of his damnation differ from reprobation? If God's love does not prevent Him from creating someone when He has a certain knowledge of their damnation then how does it prevent Him from creating someone with the deliberate intent to damn them? To create with foreknowledge is to create with intent.
I am interested to know how some folks here would answer this. I kind of know how our Open Theists over here would answer this, so I'm mostly interested in the more traditional understanding, but your comments are welcome too.
If God knew from the beginning of time what every person would choose and when, then everyone must inevitably come do what was foreknown and at the appointed time, and the Calvinists are right.
There is simply no logical way to reconcile God's forknowledge of every choice of man with the concept of libertarian free will of man. Calvinists know this. Arminians don't. The latter try to integrate two conflicting theses.
Of course, if God has such forknowledge, it is not that forknowldege that
causes man to act in accordance to it. No one argues for that.
Rather it would be the fact that such forknowledge would imply that statements about man's future choices have truth value
before those choices are made.
If at time T, it is true that P will choose R at time T+1, then P cannot refrain from choosing R at time T+1. Thus he is not free to choose not R.
Similarily, if at time T it is false that P will choose R at time T+1, then P cannot choose R at time T+1. Thus he is not free to choose R.
Either way, there is something P is not free to choose. Thus he does not have libertarian free will.
However, if we believe P does have libertarian free will, the we will have to reject the notion that statements about the choices of free will agents have truth value before those choices are made (that is, that they are either true or false). Those choices will
become either true or false after they are made.
Finally, if statements about those choices are neither true or false before they are made, then they cannot be known to be true or false before they are made.
Take your choice: 1] People have libertarian freedom and their choices cannnot be known in advance or 2] People do not have libertarian freedom and their choices
can be known in advance.
To hold to neither 1] nor 2] but rather to 3] People have libertarian freedom and their choices can be known in advance, is to accept a proposition that is logically self-contradictory.
