darin-houston wrote:PaulT wrote:RFCA wrote:PaulT,
You wrote:
Let me suggest another possibility, you weren’t provided the full quote, nor the context the quote came from. The quote that you’ve commented upon was the critics viewpoint of Calvin’s and not, I repeat not Calvin’s position,
Thanks for pointing this out.. I think I did mistake Calvin for stating the quotes I based my arguments upon. What I'll do is i'll look the texts (also the other quotes posted by Troy C) up in the internet so I don't misrep anyone.
In Christ,
Richard
No problem, thank you for the admission. Like I’ve previously pointed out, I typically don’t question motives, but in this case it does seem odd that the quote was positioned in such a way as to give the appearance that Calvin was merely stating his position rather than pointing out what his critic was claiming. Troy seems to be a decent enough guy, he no doubt has listened to teachers who haven’t taken the time, nor had the inclination to really investigate the position they are opposing.
PaulT
First, I appreciate this dialogue -- I hadn't understood Calvin's distinctions in this regard before. However, I do still think he is wrong. (I have also read other things that seem to contradict this, but can't recall where).
I do now recognize that Calvin in this work refused to admit that he believed God caused Adam's sin, but that is still the logical consequence of his beliefs. He appeals to mystery a great deal in this respect, but even his presuppositions and understanding of causation are flawed in my opinion. Much work has been done since Calvin (and before) in legal philosophy in terms of proximate and other causation that he didn't appear to grasp.
Notwithstanding Calvin's appeal to the Medean axe man in cutting down the tree, there is some flawed logic, here, stemming from a flawed understanding of proximate cause. The principle difference from a legal causation (read "blame") here is that the axe man had no foreseeability that his tree might end up causing the destruction. However, God's knowledge (and even Will), as admitted by Calvin is perfect and complete before Creation as to not only the foreseeability of Adam's fall, but in the certainty of it (according to Calvin's view of ordination). He attempts to remove God's culpability by granting Adam a freewill and appealing to the intervening will of Adam, but I don't think that gets the job done in light of God's omniscience, and it does nothing to answer why such freewill isn't granted, as well, to man post-fall.
Darin, thanks for the follow-up, however you miss the point of the OP, whether you buy his logic isn’t the topic of the OP, the topic is, was Calvin’s position truly, “God makes man wicked”? Now that you’ve been enlightened about Calvin’s position, what you refer to as “distinction” (1st time I ever herd “free-will” termed as distinction) do you agree that Gregg misrepresented his position and should retract his claim he made on the show the day after the debate ended. I mean to maintain that Calvin who held Adam had a free-will while asserting his position was that “God makes man wicked” in the face of this incontrovertible evidence would seemingly demonstrate intellectual dishonesty with the subject, wouldn’t you agree? In your esteemed opinion was Calvin’s position “God makes man wicked”? Now, trying to stay on topic.
You think you understand the logical consequences of Calvin’s beliefs and you admit you haven’t even read his institutes; sounds like the judgment went out before the jury ever came in. I would have thought one of the 1st courses in legal school would have been evaluating the whole argument. Help me out here are you suggesting the only way for God not to be guilty of proximate cause in your esteemed legal mind is to not have as an attribute omniscience? This would then seem to present a problem for any orthodox view of God. To be fair isn’t Calvin’s point that God is a bit further removed from the issue than proximate cause would contemplate? Perhaps over the years the terminology has taken on different meanings. If what you are suggesting is as I surmise I think Calvin deals with your attempt to discredit him by pointing out God could have made man without the capacity to sin and therefore mitigated proximate cause although he doesn’t use this term, but then man would not have had the capacity to choose anything other than do good. “If any one objects that it, (Adam) was placed, as it were, in a slippery position, because its power was weak, I answer, that the degree conferred was sufficient to take away every excuse. For surely the Deity could not be tied down to this condition, - to make man such, that he either could not or would not sin. Such a nature might have been more excellent; but to expostulate with God as if he had been bound to confer this nature on man, is more than unjust, seeing he had full right to determine how much or how little He would give.” I would think, although I could be wrong, that Calvin would suggest your “proximate cause” is unjustly conferred on the Creator due to the distinction in natures between the Creator and the creature. Perhaps believing God is further removed from the issue than you surmise based on the limited content of Calvin’s work you have made available to yourself, Calvin’s view would be something like God is the ultimate cause as He created everything, but that Satan’s proposition is the proximate cause of Adam’s fall from grace.
The issues you raise are good, although one is left to wonder who, (although your champion denies the clear meaning of the text I think the Apostle covers your objection in Romans 9) would deem God culpable because the Creator all knowing and all powerful nevertheless gave man free will which resulted in his fall against the posted rules, which according to you, makes God therefore culpable. BTW, does “proximate cause” include a clause that if the proper precautions were taken and the mishap still occurred due to the offending parties ignoring of the posted rules would the party who took the precautions still remain culpable? IOW, if one suspecting or knowing an issue may or would arise took all reasonable steps to overt the issue would they then be deemed culpable of proximate cause? Perhaps God will have need to enlist the services of Johnny Cochran? I doubt there is a glove large enough to fit.
It would appear based on your explanation of the issue that the only reasonable course for God not to be guilty of proximate cause based on the orthodox view of His attributes is either He doesn’t have the attributes orthodoxy claims He has or that when He created man He bestowed upon him all of His knowledge so that the creature was no longer the creature but side by side with the Creator, (sounds like Gregg’s chess match) essentially in the area of knowledge another God, which the Scripture clearly teaches there is none, and would have gone against God’s nature to so create. Therefore in this way because man was given complete, perfect and as extensive knowledge as God he can determine his own destiny without God’s knowledge, because mans actions would then be based on knowledge not derived from God but rather himself, man in the area of knowledge would be aseitic and therefore God is not culpable of proximate cause. The problem you have is that man as the creature is finite in being and because knowledge is not separated or set aside from being, but rather apart of the finite being and not self-derived you have an inferior creature limiting the attributes of the Creator. Perhaps there is another reasonable response short of making man in the area of knowledge God. My vote would be with Calvin given that you haven’t read his work. BTW, if you take the time and truly seek the truth as Gregg would have us believe the folks who regularly frequent this site do, you will find the answer to your 2nd question, “and it does nothing to answer why such freewill isn't granted, as well, to man post-fall.” Remember the purpose of the OP.
However, if you would like to pursue this line of thought please start a thread, it could be interesting.
PaulT